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Europe in 2009 is confronted with multiple crises 
– financial, economic, environmental and social. 
The need for sustainable policies is self-evident. 
The European Greens are proposing a “Green
New Deal”, an integrated policy to approach
these challenges. The concept tackles the crisis 
not exclusively as an economic one and calls for 
the ecological transformation of our economies
towards more sustainable and equitable patterns
of consumption and production.
The Wuppertal Institute report focuses on the 
climate, environment and energy aspects of this 
Green New Deal. It takes stock of the “recovery 
packages” introduced by governments around 
the globe and reveals that the European Union 
is lagging behind the United States and Asia 
in terms of the Green share of those recovery 
plans. The authors show the economic and 
employment potential of a Green New Deal 
and that the EU has the possibility of leading 
the way. If it is not to miss this opportunity, the 
European Union and its Member States must 
focus their programmes on investments that 
will kick-start a Green economy and provide 
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Message from the publishers
By publishing this study commissioned by the Greens/European Free Alliance (EFA) Group in the European 
Parliament and carried out by a research team at the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and 
Energy, the Green European Foundation (GEF) demonstrates its ambition to contribute to the dissemination 
of ideas and research on the necessary transformation of contemporary capitalism. A transition towards 
more sustainable and equitable patterns of production and consumption is needed not only inside each 
of our societies, but also between the different regions of the world. 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008, in all its length and intensity, has shaken (at least provisionally) a sig-
nificant number of what previously seemed to be ‘certainties’ and firm convictions, in particular on the 
respective roles of states and markets. Nonetheless, we were made to re-live a story that is only too well-
known: the privatisation of profits and the socialisation of losses. In September 2009, while stock markets 
are recovering, unemployment is still on the rise and all the employment forecasts for 2010 predict that 
the labour market situation will continue to deteriorate. Is this really inevitable? 
The Greens also see the economic and social crisis as an opportunity that gives credibility to and promotes 
both Green analyses and ensuing political priorities. The crisis rehabilitates state intervention. It calls 
for policies to stimulate demand, and hence for public investment, as well as determined policies aimed 
at creating employment opportunities. At the same time, the ecological crisis points to the scarcity of 
resources, the degradation of natural environments and the unsustainable Western ecological footprint.
Al Gore’s standing, Nicholas Stern’s study and the work of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), among others, have helped various actors – 
going well beyond the Green political family – to realise that changes in our way of life are now imperative. 
During their 2009 election campaign, the European Greens put forward their proposals for a European 
and a global “Green Deal” – a symbolic reference to the policies implemented to recover from the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, a recovery which was only finally achieved after the Second World War. Obviously 
that is something that we must avoid repeating at all costs, but, as was the case back then, time is short. 
The results of the European elections, as well as the difficulties encountered within the framework of the 
G20 and in preparing the United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009, 
prove that there is still a long way to go to convince, decide and act in the right direction.
Only one dimension of a “Green Deal” is analysed in this study: public and private investment in eco-
industries, in transport and in the development of renewable energies, as well as the worldwide transfer 
of these technologies. The 2008-2009 recovery plans represented – and still represent – an opportunity 
to begin or speed up (depending on the country) a necessary and urgent change in orientation. In dem-
onstrating the positive employment impact which would result from this change, the authors argue that 
while the ecological transformation of our economies certainly presupposes costs for certain sectors of 
the economy, it will also generate wealth and activity. Given that current policies inside the European 
Union – at the national as well as European level – are not ambitious enough in this respect, there is 
enormous potential – which is both technically and financially feasible - to build a better future.
The Green European Foundation will continue, throughout various projects and publications, to disseminate 
political analyses and recommendations such as the ones proposed by the Wuppertal Institute in this 
study. We would like to thank the authors and the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament for this 
valuable contribution. 
Heidi Hautala  Pierre Jonckheer
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Foreword
We are confronted with the convergence of multiple crises - economic, environment and social - which 
call for a global response. In the 1930s, President Franklin D. Roosevelt launched his ambitious “New 
Deal” to get America out of the Great Depression, the stock market crash and soaring unemployment. 
Today’s crisis is not only economic and it can only be fought with an integrated policy approach: A GREEN 
NEW DEAL. This has been acknowledged as a global challenge by United Nations Secretary General Ban 
Ki Moon and the the UN Environment Programme (UNEP).
Seeking to overcome the economic crisis by putting more pressure on the environment is not an option, 
because global warming and resource depletion are already threatening our very existence. Overcoming 
the environmental crisis by putting the breaks on citizens’ economic activities, with the risk that unem-
ployment and poverty will soar to unprecedented heights, is not an option either. Our strategic task is to 
decouple economic activity, the use of resources and environmental impacts while creating sustainable 
and decent jobs for our citizens. 
Over the past year, billions of Euros have been spent in Europe, the US and other industrialised countries 
on so-called ‘recovery packages’ to overcome the economic crisis. From the beginning, our Group called 
for these unprecedented amounts of public money to be used to green the economy and begin the eco-
logical transformation of product and service markets towards more sustainable patterns. 
This is not an easy task and needs ‘enlightened’ political strategies. That is why we approached the 
Wuppertal Institute to help us take stock of the current situation and identify the most suitable areas, 
effective instruments and best practices for promoting our Green New Deal.
The report reveals that the recovery packages launched in the European Union are lagging behind those 
of the United States and Asia, and it presents evidence to demonstrate the economic and employment 
potential of a Green New Deal. The report takes a pragmatic approach in the sense that it focuses primarily 
on how to ‘green’ immediate recovery activities in specific economic areas, and how to support the 
creation of framework conditions which initiate a dynamic for ecological modernisation and structural 
change. It also identifies key elements for the implementation of a Green New Deal.
The report shows that the EU and its Member States have many of the ingredients needed to deliver an 
effective Green New Deal. What is lacking is political determination and leadership. No scientific study 
can help overcome this. Only a political strategy that can command widespread support and puts pressure 
on the institutions and on political actors to change direction can do so. The case studies presented in 
this report show that the development of eco-industries in some Member States depends on a societal 
consensus regarding key aspects of sustainability and a determined government which is able to set and 
enforce high environmental standards. 
The EU must play a leading role in orchestrating a Green New Deal, ecological modernisation and the 
creation of green jobs. We know that the EU has a number of targeted programmes at its disposal which 
have the potential to develop into central elements of such a strategy. One of our main tasks as a politi-
cal group in the European Parliament will be to find ways to transform EU policies by attaching strong 
environmental and resource-use conditions to activities financed by the EU’s Structural Funds, research 
programmes, recovery spending, etc.
We thank the research team at the Wuppertal Institute for the valuable work they have done within the 
tight deadlines we gave them. We take a lot of political inspiration from this cooperation.
Rebecca Harms   
Co-president of the Greens/
European Free Alliance Group 
in the European Parliament
Claude Turmes
Vice-president of the Greens/
European Free Alliance Group 
in the European Parliament
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Executive Summary
Following the financial and economic crisis of 
2008, a number of governments around the 
world have made a powerful contribution to 
active economic policy-making by launching 
recovery packages. Most of these packages have 
green elements, sometimes of a considerable 
size. European recovery programmes are small 
in relative and absolute terms, especially compared 
to Asian programmes, but we can nevertheless 
expect strong global statedriven demand pushing 
green markets.
The real impact of the green stimulus of recovery 
packages remain to be seen. Discussions about 
actual sizes, measures and even additional pack-
ages are in many cases still ongoing. Comparing 
the green share of recovery programmes is 
often difficult, not least because there is no 
general consensus on which measures are 
supposedly green. This is one of the main reasons 
why Europe needs a clear vision of what a Green 
New Deal is all about.
Many studies and commentaries on the green 
share of recovery programmes focus on climate 
and energy issues, but a Green New Deal com-
prises – and should comprise – more than an 
answer to climate change. It needs to promote 
eco-industries with a clear vision of a green 
modernisation of the economy. 
Based on the Eurostat/OECD definition of eco- 
industries, we define a Green New Deal as targeted 
state investment in activities which produce 
goods and services to measure, prevent, limit, 
minimise or correct environmental damage to 
water, air and soil, as well as problems related 
to waste, noise and eco-systems. This includes 
innovation in cleaner technologies and products 
and services that reduce environmental risk and 
minimise pollution and resource use. 
In the EU, eco-industries already generate a 
considerable turnover and employment. Different 
studies confirm excellent potential for further 
growth. They also show that this is unevenly 
distributed within the EU. Therefore, successful 
innovation and industry policies by the market 
frontrunners could be a model for the active diffu-
sion of eco-innovation in all EU Member States.
Support for eco-industries alone is not enough, 
because even green economic growth can be 
harmful, if it merely contributes to increasing 
an already unsustainably high level of natural 
resource consumption. Thus, a Green New Deal 
needs to be more than a technology platform for 
eco-industries. It has to be guided by a vision of 
what a green modernisation of industry should 
look like in the long run. A Green New Deal 
requires structural change on all policy levels to 
achieve three objectives. It should: 
1. Break up unsustainable structures
2. Build up sustainable structures
3. Give the right mid- to long-term orientation
A Green New Deal should meet these objectives 
at the strategic level, at the level of individual EU 
policies and at the programming level.
Strategies
At the strategic level, there is a lack of a long-
term guiding vision of sustainable production 
and consumption patterns beyond low carbon. 
The green parts of the Lisbon Strategy combined 
with the Sustainable Development Strategy con-
tain elements which could be used as central 
building blocks of such a vision. In particular, 
the huge gap in energy and material productiv-
ity between EU Member States (up to a factor 
of 8!) should become the central challenge for 
guiding (eco-innovation) policies. This requires 
support for efficiency frontrunners and techno-
logical leapfrogging in regions with low resource 
productivity. This would enable the EU to harvest 
a double-dividend of decreased pressure on 
the environment (including CO2 emissions) and 
increased competitiveness due to the reduction in 
production costs. Thus the EU would set itself on 
a development path which would eventually lead 
towards consumption and production patterns 
respecting ecological boundaries in Europe and 
beyond.
Policies
Major EU policies could boost the resource 
efficiency of EU industries and infrastructure 
by combining EU and national funds. In par-
ticular, with the Cohesion Policy, the European 
Union has a funding system dedicated to structural 
change which is already operating on a similar 
scale to the green stimulus in European recovery 
programmes. By combining national recovery 
programmes with EU Regional Funds, the EU 
Member States could create the necessary finan-
cial leverage to change production and consump-
tion patterns, especially in regions which are 
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lagging behind. For this purpose, the European 
Parliament could initiate special fast-track financ-
ing mechanisms. Such mechanisms would give a 
“green light” to green structural interventions to 
increase the resource productivity of industry and 
infrastructure, monitored by EU Structural Indica-
tors on energy and material efficiency.
Programmes
Short-term Community support for a Green New 
Deal could be followed up by more consolidated 
medium-term action to integrate the necessary 
components of an appropriate policy mix. This 
could be achieved through improvements at the 
programming level. The EU has a number of 
sophisticated innovation programmes which are 
already contributing to a greening of the EU econ-
omy (e.g. ETAP, CIP). Different EU programmes 
affecting eco-innovation would have to converge 
and should be strengthened with Cohesion Funds 
for improving overall resource productivity (energy 
and materials). Integrated schemes for using 
RTD, innovation and regional development pro-
grammes could be the financial foundation for 
developing, at the European and regional level, 
a “triple-helix” consisting of stakeholders from 
enterprises, the public sector, research and teach-
ing who could drive and create a self-sustaining 
market for improving resource efficiency in the 
European Union. 
Priority areas for bringing about a regional trans-
formation could be sustainable mobility, as well 
as energy and material efficiency.
 
Sustainable Transport Policy
Improving the sustainability of transportation 
is not only a key challenge in fighting climate 
change and other environmental problems. As 
an important sector in modern economies, more 
efficient and sustainable transport systems con-
tribute to economic growth. Thus, the integration 
of sustainable transport investments in European 
recovery plans can provide important stimuli for 
economic growth and employment.
When it comes to political strategies and social 
and economic conditions, freight and passenger 
transport are quite different, as are earth-bound 
and plane or ship transport. Thus, this paper con-
centrates on describing problems and solutions in 
the field of ‘earth-bound’ passenger transport.
A sustainable policy for passenger transport should 
focus on three basic strategies: 
1. Reducing the need for transport.
2.  A shift to more sustainable modes of transport. 
3.  Increasing the efficiency of vehicles and the 
traffic flow. 
With respect to the sustainability of measures, 
a hierarchy of these three strategies can be 
introduced.
Reducing the need for transport is a top priority, 
as it allows mobility to be maintained while 
reducing the kilometres travelled. This notion of 
mobility is defined by the capacity to carry out 
different human activities such as business, 
work, purchase, leisure and other social and 
cultural activities. An integrated policy of transport 
and spacial development is therefore necessary, 
and this requires long-term development. Thus it 
is not the focus of recovery packages that concen-
trate on quick results.
A second strategic aspect of sustainable mobility 
concerns the way in which the remaining trans-
port needs are satisfied. The different modes of 
earth-bound transport – walking, cycling, buses, 
trains and cars – have different environmental 
advantages and disadvantages. It is reasonable 
to support zero-emission mobility over short dis-
tances, and train and public transport (by bus or 
tram) over medium-range or longer distances. 
This includes the provision of infrastructure and 
interconnections to promote intermodality, the 
purchase of vehicles, mobility management, and 
the provision of information, education and ser-
vices. These act as pull-factors for a modal shift. 
Push factors should also be introduced: speed 
limits, low-emission zones or congestion charges, 
eco-taxes on fuel and higher motor vehicle taxes 
for gas guzzlers are examples of measures 
that help to level the playing field for more sus- 
tainable modes of transport.
The third strategic pillar is improving the efficiency 
of transport. This includes measures relating 
to vehicle technology as well as intelligent traffic 
management systems and eco-driving. Policy 
instruments in this field include emission limits, 
fiscal measures to integrate the external costs of 
transport and R&D programmes. The latter two 
are possible parts of a Green New Deal.
In summary, the following possible elements of a 
Green New Deal can be identified:
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•  investments in new public transport vehicles – 
buses, trams and regional trains; 
•  investments in infrastructure for bicycles and 
pedestrians which are realisable in the short 
term;
•  investments in infrastructure improvements 
for public transport;
•  investments in services to make public  
transport more user-friendly;
•  incentives for retro-fitting cars and public 
transport vehicles; 
•  fiscal measures to subsidise high-efficiency  
vehicles;
•  research on energy-efficiency technologies;
•  marketing of more sustainable modes of  
transport; 
• education about eco-driving.
Sustainable Energy Policy
An EU Green New Deal will have a greater long-term 
impact on emission reductions and employment 
if it is embedded in a coherent policy mix at EU, 
Member State and regional level. 
Four main strategic fields can be identified: 
1.  Energy performance of buildings (residen-
tial, tertiary, and industrial buildings; existing 
buildings; new buildings; heating and cooling 
systems, including the use of renewable 
energies; smart metering)
In the buildings sector, a new consultancy scheme 
should be launched to issue service vouchers for 
homeowners and SMEs. Additional direct grants 
for retro-fitting existing buildings should promote 
renewable energies and high energy efficiency 
standards. Additional pilot projects for passive- 
or zero-emission houses need to be launched to 
improve the performance of the existing stock of 
buildings. Intelligent combinations of high energy 
performance standards for the buildings them-
selves and renewable energies are required to 
reduce energy consumption and emissions from 
the buildings sector significantly. A Green New 
Deal should support cities and regions to develop 
zero-emission zones or zero-emission cities. For 
new buildings, ‘energy-plus’ houses provide an 
example for new building standards in general. 
The integration of low emission strategies with 
resource efficiency in new buildings requires 
further external financial support (e.g. BREEAM, 
CASBEE, Effinergie, DGNB and LEED). Supporting 
reductions in the energy consumption of heating 
and air-conditioning systems can also contribute 
significantly to reducing emissions. Old and 
inefficient heating sytems need to be replaced or 
modernised. Energy-efficient engine technology, 
for example, can reduce the electricity used by 
circulation pumps and fans by up to 80%. 
2. Energy use of electrical appliances
The market penetration of energy-efficient appli-
ances is still at a very low level.  More measures 
are needed to support reductions in the energy 
consumption of office, communication, and 
entertainment appliances in both stand-by and 
on-mode. The following measures are recom-
mended: 
•  support programmes for the most energy- 
efficient white appliances;
•  support programmes for office, communication, 
and entertainment appliances without a stand-by 
facility and with low on-mode consumption. 
3. Emissions in industrial processes
An EU Green New Deal should support a com-
bination of voluntary agrements with financial 
incentives (e.g. tax deductions). A combination 
of free or subsidised energy audits (consultancy 
and audit vouchers); regional and/or sectoral 
networks and sectoral energy schemes (as, for 
example, in North Rhine-Westphalia); energy 
services; and targeted financial support pro-
grammes to promote end-use - for example in 
the sectoral networks or schemes - appears to 
be the most successful policy-mix for stimulating 
energy efficiency. 
4. Electricity Grids and Smart Metering in the EU
 
Recent EU regulation, especially the Directive on 
energy end-use efficiency and energy services 
(ESD), has clearly emphasised the role of smart 
metering systems. A European Green New Deal 
should support the development and implemen-
tation of smart metering systems in order to: 
•  create awareness among consumers about 
energy consumption, energy costs and  
greenhouse gas emissions; 
•  motivate consumers to monitor energy  
consumption and to take additional action;
•  decrease the running costs of metering and 
billing;
•  create the technical basis for managing peak 
demand and integrating renewable energy 
sources.
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More widespread use of smart-metering systems 
also requires a flexible European electricity 
grid. The structure of the European grid needs to 
be adapted to general developments in the energy 
supply market, the integration of large decentralised 
renewable supply systems, and the integration 
of large-scale offshore wind and concentrated 
solar power plants. Only innovative and smart 
grid technologies will be able to manage these 
strategic challenges and realise the potential 
for greater energy conservation. Additional 
funding should focus on EU-wide distribution and 
transmission infrastructure.
Sustainable Resource Policy
Europe is highly dependent on a wide variety of 
natural resources from domestic sources as 
well from other parts of the world. Rising global 
demand from emerging economies will increase 
resource prices and the risk of limited access to 
resources. Therefore, a strong economic argu-
ment for resource efficiency is the significant 
potential for cost reduction, with two major effects: 
improved competitiveness and job creation. 
Resource productivity could therefore be a core 
element of a Green New Deal, which could not 
only deliver short-term results but also a stronger 
economy overall.
Official Eurostat figures reveal a wide resource- 
efficiency gap between EU Member States of up 
to a factor 17. The EU could realise considerable 
environmental and competitive advantages if it 
systematically addressed the internal resource 
productivity gap. This would entail promoting the 
existing resource policies of the frontrunners and 
leap-frogging strategies for regions which are 
lagging behind.
In the long-term, resource efficiency has to be 
embedded in a more comprehensive vision of 
a sustainable use and management of natural 
resources, which may be characterised by four 
paradigmatic and complementary perspectives: 
1.  A resource-efficient and recycling-based  
industrial sector 
2.  A steady stocks society, in which the material 
growth of the economy will be superseded by 
a dynamic equilibrium between construction 
and deconstruction
3.  A solar economy using the natural energy 
supply from the sun; and 
4.  A balanced bio-economy based on the  
sustainable use of biological resources.
On a pragmatic and short- to mid-term basis, 
there are five core objectives for the first para-
digm of a resource-efficient and recycling-based 
industry: 
1. Sustainable markets for the future 
2. Strong institutions 
3. Resource-efficient products and services
4.  The Government as consumer – role model 
and market power
5. Changes in people’s thinking.
To have a short-term impact on economic develop-
ment and job creation, the combined creation of a 
European Resource Efficiency Agency (EREA) and 
national Resource Efficiency Funds (REF) could be 
an adequate strategy in the Green New Deal.
The EREA would initiate international cooperation 
and communication to raise awareness in Member 
States and industry in order to stimulate demand 
for consultancy services. Awareness of the cost-
reduction potential among decision-makers 
in industry would lead to an increased demand 
for specific resource-efficiency technologies, 
products and services. The desired long-term 
effect would be a self-sustaining competition to 
obtain the cost advantages of resource efficiency 
in the EU’s manufacturing industry.
The national Resource Efficiency Funds would 
finance resource efficiency, especially in SMEs, 
which often lack sufficient capital and expertise 
to introduce resource efficiency measures. The 
national REFs could co-finance EU Regional Funds. 
Resource-efficient public procurement could be 
an additional instrument to support resource 
efficiency directly. Public institutions should start 
to improve procurement procedures and assets 
by investing in resource-efficient products and 
services. 

15A Green New Deal for Europe
1. Introduction
The world is in crisis. An unprecedented breakdown of the financial sector hit the globe in 2008. 
Whole economies are being rocked by unemployment and financial instability threatens the social 
and economic stability of the European Union. 
At the same time, the natural environment is changing on a global scale. Climate change, declining 
biological diversity and dwindling natural resources are an increasing threat to the development of 
societies.
How can EU policy-makers and other actors rescue our economies and the natural environment? 
Can we only safeguard our economic wealth at the expense of nature? Is there an alternative of 
striking a Green New Deal which would at the same time boost economic development, create jobs 
and decrease pressure on the environment? Could Europe emerge stronger and more sustainable 
than it was at the start of the current economic crisis?
This study presents research results on economic recovery packages and their potential for con-
tributing to a Green New Deal. It proposes a greening of the economy and presents evidence of 
its economic and employment potential. Against this background, it considers short- to mid-term 
political strategies and instruments in the European Union and provides recommendations for a 
Green New Deal in the EU.
The study focuses primarily on immediate recovery activities and supporting framework conditions, 
which are currently being launched throughout the world. Therefore it identifies some elements 
of a new “green” policy mix, but does not attempt to outline comprehensive reforms to green the 
economy. Long-term fiscal reforms, or fundamental shifts to a steady-state economy and other 
more profound changes will be needed eventually to allow for sustainable development in the 
European Union, but they are not the subject of this study. A Green New Deal has to take a pragmatic 
approach to immediate recovery plans, but it should nevertheless initiate some first steps in the 
direction of ecological modernisation and structural change. A Green New Deal will therefore not 
be a complete strategy for ecological modernisation, but it could help Europe to emerge stronger 
and more sustainable than it was before the current crisis. 
© Shutterstock

17A Green New Deal for Europe
2. Comparison of recovery packages
Soon after the beginning of the economic crisis, 
governments around the world recognised that the 
state would have to compensate rapidly dwindl- 
ing private investments with large recovery packages. 
The world has turned away from previous laisser-
faire approaches and towards more a proactive 
role for the state. Recent studies have tried to 
compare different packages. This research has 
often been based on preliminary government 
information about the different recovery packages 
that were often still in the making. Often unclear 
explanations of the terms of reference and 
differences in methodologies have resulted in a 
range of different assessments. Based on various 
studies, the following section contains basic in-
formation about the total sizes of the recovery 
packages, their composition and potential.
2.1 The overall size of the recovery 
packages
According to a first overview by HBSC (2009), the 
absolute size of the recovery packages which 
















US          China       Japan      Germany      Italy            EU   South-Korea  France    Canada         UK          Spain
Figure 1 Absolute volumes of selected recovery packages in bn€ (based on HSBC 2009)
© iStockphoto.com/Dan Moore
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Most recovery packages are still in the process 
of development and ratification. Thus their actual 
size and the exact financial details are still 
changing. More recent studies from OECD (2009) 
give different absolute sizes for the packages. For 
instance, those of Spain and Canada are signifi-
cantly higher, at €56.8 bn and €61.6 bn. 
A relative comparison taking into account the 
different sizes of countries’ economies might be 
more meaningful. Comparisons of figures are 
problematic, because the different packages 
often have different timespans. A comparison 
which takes into account the size of economies 
and the timeframe can be found in Saha and 
Weizsäcker (2009). They estimated the amount of 
stimulus spending in 2009 in the EU, the US and 
in China in relation to GDP as shown in Table 1.
In relation to its GDP, the US is spending exactly 
twice as much than the EU in 2009, while China’s 
recovery package is almost eight times larger.
Table 1 Comparison of 2009 spending and GDP
 (Saha &Weizsäcker 2009, p.5)
A comparison of total stimulus spending in differ-
ent regions of the world in relation to global GDP 
underlines the relatively small size of the European 
packages. As shown in figure 2, Europe makes the 
third largest contribution to bringing the global 
economy out of crisis. It is twice as large as that of 
Near/East and Africa, one-third of US spending and 
less than one-third of the Asian/Oceanian effort. 
The Nobel Prize laureate Paul Krugmann con-
cluded at a press conference in Brussels on 
17th March that the European stimulus pack-
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Green : 17.6  
58.71% EU
Figure 3 Ratio of green stimulus of national recovery packages, absolute volumes in bn€ (based on Bernard et al. 
2009; data from HSBC 2009)
2.2 Comparing the green share
In addition to their overall size, the green share 
of the recovery plans also varies considerably, 
ranging from 1.3% in Italy to 80.5% in South Korea, 
as shown above.
HSBC (2009) defines green stimuli as spending 
under 18 themes identified by the HSBC Climate 
Change Index. Its study covers low carbon power, 
energy efficiency, water/waste and pollution 
control. “Green” refers to “a sizeable slice of fiscal 
stimulus plans allocated to launching a low-
carbon recovery” (HSBC 2009, p.1).Bowen et al. 
(2009) have proposed a green share of total stim-
ulus packages in the order of an average of 20%. 
This would result in a rough figure of some €300 
bn of public spending annually. This is in line with 
McKinsey & Company (2009), who estimated that 
€320 bn a year until 2015 will be needed to put 
the global economy on a low-carbon trajectory.
With the exception of France and the European 
Commission, the green element in EU Member 
States’ and the US’ stimulus packages is lower 
than the proposed 20% share. In contrast, China 
and South Korea are far ahead, with shares of 
37.8% and 80.5% respectively. However, it needs 
to be stressed that the green share of a stimulus 
package does not indicate how green overall gov-
ernment spending is.
UNEP (2009) identifies an emerging consensus 
among the international community on a global 
Green New Deal. In the coming years, large public 
investment programmes should be implemented 
in order to achieve the aims of reduced carbon 
dependency, job creation, environmental protection 
and a reduction in world poverty. According to the 
UN Environment Programme (2009), the current 
amount of green stimulus in the national recovery 
plans of the G20 governments is not enough by far.
Most studies on the green stimulus do not consider 
the quality of green spending. Usually, they can 
only produce estimates based on government 
information as to whether the measures are green 
or not. In addition, recent studies do not take into 
account ambivalence or counter-productive ele-
ments in the proposed activities. The US package, 
for instance, includes spending €21 bn on new 
roads, which will result in increased car emis-
sions (Harvey 2009). Supposedly green measures 
can also be ambivalent or debatable. For example, 
Canada has declared support for the nuclear 
industry as “green” (HSBC 2009). Another example 
is the German so-called “environmental bonus”. 
Owners of cars more than 9 years old get a 
financial bonus for scrapping their vehicles, if they 
buy a new car which meets a minimum emission 
standard of Euro 4. The risk that the new car could 
consume more fuel (if people switch from small to 
bigger cars) and/or that additional emissions and 
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material flows could result from the production of 
the new car, are often not considered. Thus, the 
“environmental bonus” for cars could have a neg-
ative effect in the long run in terms of emissions 
and material flows (T&E 2009). In comparison 
with environmentally targeted bonus systems, the 
existing schemes have already resulted in consider-
able lost opportunities (see box page 60).
A study by Ecofys & Germanwatch (2009) seeks 
to introduce a qualitative dimension to the evalu-
ation of the green stimulus. They claim that the 
effect of each dollar spent varies significantly 
depending on what it is invested in and the way it 
is spent (directly or indirectly). They define effec-
tiveness factors for each area of investment and 
policy instrument. The effectiveness factors for 
each area are defined by several qualitative cri-
teria such as the short-term emission-reduction 
potential. Counter-productive measures such as 
road building are indicated as a negative credit. 
So far only a few recovery packages have been 
evaluated, with the results illustrated in figure 4.
The weighted spending is expressed as a share 
of a country’s GDP. The negative and positive cal-
culations with coefficients have created different 
absolute volumes for each country. Nevertheless 
the study provides an idea of the differing quality 
of green spending.
For instance, Germany and the US have positive 
green spending of about 0.5% of their GDP, while 
the US has counter-productive spending totalling 
about 0.12% and Germany 0.05%. In the case of 
Italy, counter-productive spending (about 0.68%) 
exceeds positive green spending (0.02%).
Ecofys and Germanwatch (2009) conclude that 
the share of green stimulus is not big enough. 
“Stronger leadership is needed from the US and 
larger EU economies to set a positive example 
for other countries” (ibid, p.5). According to the 
study, the current stimulus packages do not pro-
tect the climate sufficiently, even as an addition 
to regular climate policy. 
In general, it should be stated that the green part 
of the programmes is mainly focused on climate 
protection and does not recognise resource 
protection in a broader sense and the connected 
economic driving forces and benefits. This is 
understandable because climate protection should 
obviously have a high priority and the economic 
benefits of climate mitigation technologies (e.g. 
end-use energy efficiency, combined heat and 
power generation and renewables) are evident. It 
is quite clear that, on the one hand, short-term 
investment impulses can only intensify long-
term climate mitigation options. On the other 
hand, the tremendous increase in the price of 
many raw materials (not only oil) before the 
crisis should have been taken as a signal that 
ecological modernisation should include not only 
climate protection but also resource protection 
as a whole. This holds true especially from an 
economic perspective, because materials as 
a share of overall industry costs and thus their 
economic vulnerability to global prices shocks 
from non-energy raw materials (especially 
metals) may be as high as from energy prices. 
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Figure 4 Evaluation of stimulus packages (Ecofys & Germanwatch 2009, p.5)
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EU 30.0 17.61 58.71% 0.50 9.66 2.20 1.50 3.75 13.86
Germany 81.0 10.69 13.20% 8.03 0.53 2.13 10.69
France 26.1 5.52 21.19% 0.67 0.64 1.01 3.19 8.71
Italy 80.0 1.02 1.28% 1.02 1.02
Spain 11.0 0.64 5.85% 0.64 0.00
UK 23.5 1.63 6.94% 0.22 1.07 0.32 0.02 1.61
US 143.0 14.07 9.84% 7.92 2.01 2.58 0.59 0.26 0.71 14.78
608.4 72.70 11.95% 17.42 3.05 21.18 3.09 7.41 8.50 12.04 69.16
Canada 24.6 2.03 8.27% 0.83 0.19 0.30 0.61 0.10 2.54
China 453.1 171.07 37.76% 1.16 76.26 54.11 39.54 185.65
Japan 375.6 9.61 2.56% 9.61 9.61
South-Korea 29.5 23.72 80.55% 1.39 4.79 1.39 5.42 10.74 12.99
Total
1885.7 330.33 17.52% 27.91 15.55 49.44 9.33 94.13 67.13 66.84
330.62
43.46 220.03 66.84
Table 2 Country specific allocation of the green stimulus in bn € (based on HSBC 2009)
All currencies converted to €. €1=$1.29
Therefore, failing to foster resource productivity 
through green recovery packages or to harvest 
the broader economic benefits connected with 
an integrated strategy to increase energy and 
material efficiency is a lost opportunity.
Looking at the carbon emission reduction poten-
tial of the recovery packages, the German IFW 
Institute (2009) concludes that 13% of the world-
wide recovery packages dedicated to climate 
protection will result in global CO2 emission 
reductions of 111 million tonnes per year. This 
is less than 0.5 percent of global emissions. IFW 
(2009) claims that the reduction potential of sev-
eral national packages is rather limited. China, 
for instance, is investing more than €130 bn in its 
rail and energy grid, which is more an extension 
of capacity than an improvement in efficiency, 
thus resulting in increased emissions. Although 
China has the second biggest recovery package, 
its reduction potential is only 22.8 million tonnes 
of CO2 per year. By comparison, the European 
recovery packages contribute to reducing annual 
CO2 emissions by 22.4 million tonnes using much 
less money. The US packages have created a 
reduction potential of 45.7 million tonnes per year 
(IFW 2009). This high figure might also be due to 
significant investments in low-carbon power pro-
duction (see 2.3). 
2.3 Composition of the green stimulus
HSBC (2009) has calculated the allocation of 
green funds to the low-carbon power, energy 
efficiency and water/waste sectors, as shown in 
the table below.
Energy efficiency measures receive the great-
est share of funds with €220.03 bn (67%), 
followed by the water treatment sector with €66.84 
bn (20%) and low-carbon power with €43.46 
bn (13%). This is in line with the global climate 
change policy census which identified energy 
efficiency measures as being the most important 
area for action up to 2020 (European Commission 
2009). McKinsey (2008) supports these findings 
by identifying the highest reduction potential (14 
Giga tonnes CO2 equivalent per year in 2030) in 
the energy-efficiency sector. Among the energy-
efficiency measures in the framework of recovery 
programmes, support for rail transport has the 
biggest share. This is primarily due to the high 
level of Chinese investment (€76.26 bn).
Ecofys & Germanwatch (2009) argue that measures 
often only focus on energy efficiency in buildings and 
cars. Other important sectors and emerging lead 
markets like renewable energies, combined heat 
and power, smart grids, energy storage and public 
transportation are not sufficiently considered (Ecofys 
& Germanwatch 2009; Hennicke et al. 2008).
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Indeed, support for renewable energy schemes is 
rather weak. Only France, the US and South Korea 
have allocated funds to this. Germany is not men-
tioned mainly because its renewable energy sector 
is already benefiting from exciting schemes like 
retro-fitting programmes and feed-in-tariffs (HSBC 
2009). In 2008 and 2009, Germany has spent about 
€850 million on alternative heating and buildings. 
According to McKinsey (2008), low-carbon energy 
supply also has a high reduction potential (12 Giga 
tonnes CO2 equivalent per year in 2030). 
The available data suggests that only the EU, the 
US and Canadian packages invest in carbon cap-
ture and storage (CCS). Canada also supports 
nuclear power, which it considers to be a low-carbon 
technology (HSBC 2009). 
Water and waste-related spending includes funding 
for general environmental improvements like the 
€39.54 bn allocated to this by China. The US and 
South Korea also contribute significantly, while 
Europe has allocated only minor funding to this area.
2.4 Job-Creation Potential
In general, the job-creation potential of the dif-
ferent stimulus packages is difficult to estimate, 
because it depends on various assumptions. 
This holds true for calculating (net) employment 
effects in general and for the results of existing 
studies. For example, sometimes only the gross 
effects are calculated in studies on renewables, 
without subtracting the job losses in traditional 
energy production. Many studies do not include 
the indirect impact of macroeconomic multip-
liers of additional investment (or cost reductions). 
Other studies only look at additional costs and do 
not calculate, for example, the additional tax rev-
enues (self-financing effects) generated by state 
investment programmes. For strategies aimed 
at resource productivity (energy and material 
efficiency) in particular, it is not only the additional 
costs of investments that matter but also the 
macroeconomic effects of cost reductions and 
alternative spending of the money saved on raw 
materials. As a rule of thumb, existing studies 
suggest that about 100 net jobs can be created by 
reducing energy consumption by one TWh. There-
fore, the direction of macroeconomic impacts 
(net jobs, additional growth and tax revenues) of 
resource protection strategies is well-established, 
but the induced quantity and substitution effects 
(e.g. direct and indirect rebound effects) of effi-
ciency strategies are often forgotten and deserve 
much greater recognition in further research.
The short-term studies on very recent economic 
recovery developments do not allow for in-depth 
assessments, let alone the necessary econo-
metric modelling. Nevertheless, a few attempts have 
been made to assess the job-creation potential of 
different programmes, although in most cases 
only gross effects are described:
Germany: According to a study by the German  
Institute for Employment (IAB) no less than 
250,000 jobs can be saved through the German 
stimulus plan (FAZ 2009).
France: A job-creation potential of 80,000-
110,000 is estimated, offset by the possible loss 
of 90,000 jobs (HSBC 2009). 
UK: 350,000 jobs can be saved and gained in the 
low-carbon sector (HSBC 2009).
Canada: An estimated 407,000 jobs can be  
created (HSBC 2009).
South Korea: A total of 960,000 jobs are  
envisaged, mainly through green spending  
(HSBC 2009).
US: In total, the stimulus package aims  
to create and save 3,500,000 jobs in the US  
(DB Advisors 2009).
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2.6 Intermediate result
Primarily based on the evidence presented, we 
may conclude that the overall size of EU recov-
ery packages is low in comparison to the US and 
Chinese plans. European programmes contain a 
small green share compared to the Asian pro-
grammes, but it needs to be stressed that there 
is insufficient evidence on the quality of green 
spending. Nevertheless, the low level of green 
stimulus in the EU, especially compared with 
Asian programmes, is remarkable and might 
raise questions about global leadership in the 
ecological modernisation of the global economy.
The studies which have been published have 
been short-term assessments reflecting recent 
and short-term developments. Often, many 
aspects of the recovery packages could not be 
considered sufficiently. The recovery packages 
are being phased over different timespans. For 
instance, the US recovery packages cover a period 
of 10 years, while those in France have a two-year 
timeframe. 
Furthermore, many aspects of the recovery pack-
ages have still not been decided. Discussions on 
actual sizes, measures and even additional pack-
ages are still ongoing. Therefore, the terms of 
reference for each study should have been made 
clear, which has not always been the case. 
Another difficulty lies in identifying the green 
share. First, it is not always clear which measures 
are designed to be green and, second, the differing 
quality of the measures in relation to stimulating 
new green lead markets are not considered. 
Nevertheless, the data and references are accu-
rate enough to conclude that the total size and 
the green share of the European recovery pack-
ages is small in relative and absolute terms.
Many studies and commentaries on the green 
share of recovery programmes only focus on 
climate and energy issues, but a Green New 
Deal comprises – and should comprise – more 
than strategies for climate protection. For ex-
ample, China, South Korea and the US dedicate 
substantial funds to waste and water treatment. 
Waste and water treatment are typically clean-up 
industries reacting to environmental pollution 
after it has occurred (end-of-pipe). Especially with 
regard to competitive EU industries in the waste 
and water sector, these traditional environmental 
technologies should not be neglected. In emerging 
economies, the lack of environmental infrastruc-
ture is already creating large and growing markets 
(ECOTEC 2002; Schepelmann 2006). 
It should be recognised that, on the one hand, 
traditional end-of-pipe technologies create new 
business fields, revenues and jobs in supply 
industries and national economies, but raise 
costs in the industrial sector which applies these 
technologies. On the other hand, integrated pro-
duction and product policies reduce costs, but 
deficits in official statistics and comprehensive 
modelling make it more difficult to calculate the 
macroeconomic effects. 
Combining end-of-pipe solutions with integrated 
process and product policies in terms of energy 
and material efficiency could enable the EU to 
put its stamp on this attractive market. Beyond 
climate change, a European Green New Deal will 
have to address all aspects of green industries. 
The following chapter outlines the turnover of 
and employment in eco-industries in Europe, and 
concludes by describing the economic and politi-






























































3.  Green New Deal and eco-industries:  
empirical background and expectations
New Deal policies are usually connected to stim-
ulating demand through government spending. 
The previous chapter has shown that a Green 
New Deal means stimulating public demand in 
“green” economic sectors (e.g. energy, waste 
and water management). Eventually, this leads to 
additional turnover, employment and innovation 
in these sectors of the economy. The following 
section therefore looks at the current turnover 
and employment situation in European eco- 
industries and concludes with an outlook on the 
drivers of eco-innovation.
3.1 Definition of eco-industries
OECD and Eurostat (1999) provided a broadly 
accepted definition of eco-industries as those 
engaged in “activities which produce goods and 
services to measure, prevent, limit, minimise or 
correct environmental damage to water, air and 
soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise 
and eco-systems. This includes cleaner techno- 
logies, products and services that reduce environ-
mental risk and minimise pollution and resource 
use” (ibid, p.9). 
It should be emphasised that this definition 
focuses on ecological impacts and does not 
include the cost impacts of using the products 
of eco-industries for cost reduction, which is 
important to calculate the macroeconomic effects 
of investments. 
That means that the typical statistical classifica-
tion is also supply-oriented and does not indicate 
the different cost-effects of different technologies 
(e.g. of end-of-pipe or integrated technologies). 
Therefore, more research should be directed at 
the question of what industries and technologies 
contribute to cost reductions by avoiding unnec-
essary residues (e.g. waste water, heat or mater-
ials) which create only costs and no added value,
Broadly speaking, the industry can be sub-divided 
into pollution management, cleaner technologies 
and products, and resource management. These 





• Air Pollution Control
• Waste Water Treatment
• Waste Management
•  Remediation and Clean up of Soil  
& Groundwater
• Noise and Vibration Control
•  Environmental Monitoring  
& Instrumentation
• Environmental Research & Development
• Public Environmental Administration





• Indoor air pollution control
• Renewable energy plant
• Heat/energy saving and management
• Sustainable agriculture and fisheries
• Sustainable forestry
• Natural risk management
• Eco-tourism
Cleaner Technologies and Products
•  Cleaner/resource-efficient technologies  
and processes
• Cleaner/resource-efficient products 
Two major studies commissioned by DG Environ-
ment have been carried out to examine the 
European eco-industry. One has been published 
by ECOTEC (2002) for the base year 1999 and 
the other by Ernst & Young (2006) for the base 
year 2004, with the latter regarded as a five-year 
update of the 1999 study.
Both studies use the definition provided by OECD 
and Eurostat with slight variations. 
Within the ECOTEC study (2002), the “cleaner 
technologies and products” sector is included 
in the “pollution management” sector. In the 
“resource management” sector, only the water 
supply, recycled materials and nature protection” 
subsectors have been included.
In contrast to ECOTEC (2002) and Ernst & Young 
(2006) and the underlying classification of OECD 
and Eurostat (1999), Jänicke & Zieschank (2008) 
have proposed including “cleaner technologies” 
as well as “solid waste management and recycl-
ing” in the resource management sector. Thus 
all applications and integrated environmental 
technologies would be included in resource 
management. According to this classification, 
resource management and cleaner technologies 
have a larger market share than pollution 
control and end-of-pipe technologies (Jänicke & 
Zischank 2009).
Jänicke & Zieschank (2008) argue that the spe-
cific contribution of eco-industry is difficult to 
assess if this is becoming a major trend across 
industry in general. This would be the case if, for 
example, recognising the cost-saving potential of 
improved resource efficiency becomes a general 
trend in industry. This would eventually lead to a 
situation in which the definition and delineation 
of distinct eco-industries would be superseded.
The definition used by OECD and Eurostat is not 
explicitly used by Berger (2008) to describe the 
German eco-industry, but the defined lead markets 
are similar to the OECD/Eurostat classifi- 
cation of the sectors. By contrast, Berger (2008) 
identifies “sustainable mobility” as an additional 
sector of the eco-industry, consisting of improved 
energy efficiency in vehicles, a fall in the volume 
of traffic and improved vehicle utilisation and 
modal split.
The employment potential of eco-industries 
also depends on the underlying definition. UNEP 
(2008) defines green jobs “…as work in agricul-
tural, manufacturing, research and development 
(R&D), administrative, and service activities that 
contribute substantially to preserving or restor-
ing environmental quality. Specifically, but not 
exclusively, this includes jobs that help to pro-
tect ecosystems and biodiversity; reduce energy, 
materials, and water consumption through high 
efficiency strategies; de-carbonize the economy; 
and minimize or altogether avoid generation of 
all forms of waste and pollution” (ibid, p.35f.).
Eco-innovation is defined by Reid & Miedzinski 
(2008) as “the creation of novel and competi-
tively priced goods, processes, systems, services, 
and procedures designed to satisfy human needs 
and provide a better quality of life for everyone 
with a whole-life-cycle minimal use of natural 
resources (materials including energy and surface 
area) per unit output, and a minimal release of 
toxic substances” (ibid, p.3; see also Bleischwitz 
et al. 2009a). 
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1   This is why the German government has launched the large MaRess research project (Material Efficiency and Resource Conserva-
tion), in order to identify intervention points and to conceptualise appropriate policy-mixes, http://ressourcen.wupperinst.org
3.2 Turnover and employment in  
Europe’s eco-industries
The evidence presented about the size of the eco-
industry can only provide a rough orientation. As 
described in the previous chapter, the data on 
eco-industries has to be interpreted with care 
since there is no clear delineation of this partly 
cross-sectoral industry. 
However, past experience shows that the 
development of eco-industries requires political 
leadership, as will be demonstrated through 
the example of the global eco-market champion 
Germany (chapter 3.3.). Political action is required 
to defend and further develop the EU’s leading 
role on the world market, especially in the new 
EU Member States.
3.2.1 Turnover of eco-industries
According to assessments made by Berger 
(2008), the global market for eco-industries is 
worth about €1,000 bn, a figure which will double 
to about €2,200 bn by 2020. These are only rough 
estimates, because eco-industries are cross-
sectoral industries without statistically defined 
boundaries. Therefore, estimates of their total 
worth depend significantly on the definitions and 
exact empirical evidence.
The differentiation of markets and potential is 
often not clear, but is of the utmost importance 
for conceptualising a “New Green Deal”. If the 
impressive figures on market potential imply 
the autonomous development of self-sustained 
markets, there is no need for policy interventions 
including a Green New Deal. If these figures are 
only calculations of potential, even greater poten-
tial can be identified (e.g. for energy and material 
efficiency) – and more promising economic 
benefits can be anticipated – if existing market 
barriers and failures can be overcome by innova-
tive policy mixes (e.g. a New Green Deal). There is 
evidence that the figures cited predicting tremen-
dous economic growth in eco-industries are esti-
mates of potential which can only be turned into 
markets and new business opportunities with a 
“helping hand” from the state. This is important 
for Green New Deals in two respects: on the one 
hand, it emphasises the need to look into policy 
mixes which encourage R&D and the scaling-up 
of eco-industries; on the other hand, accelerated 
support for existing eco-industries requires addi-
tional instruments and incentive structures. 
In comparison to climate mitigation policies, the 
European Union has still no comparable studies 
and results on the development of resource poli-
cies.1 In particular, the specific key strategies, 
instruments and policy mixes have to be developed 
and the economic impacts have to be calculated 
by top-down and bottom-up modelling.
ECOTEC (2002) presents primarily 1999 data 
for the EU-15, which according to Ernst & 
Young (2006), comprised about 94% of the eco- 
industries of the EU-25 in 2004. Therefore table 4 
only includes figures for the EU-15 for comparison:
30
1999
Country Total  
Turnover 
 (€ million)
% of EU-15 Pollution 
Mgmt  
(€ million) 
 % of total 
turnover 
Resource 
Mgmt             
(€ million)
% of total 
turnover 
Germany 56,710 31.0% 41,195 72.6% 15,515 27.4%
France 37,990 20.7% 22,330 58.8% 15,660 41.2%
UK 24,470 13.4% 17,085 69.8% 7,385 30.2%
Italy 15,980 8.7% 10,700 67.0% 5,280 33.0%
Netherlands 9,610 5.2% 7,170 74.6% 2,440 25.4%
Austria 8,900 4.9% 8,275 93.0% 625 7.0%
Spain 8,030 4.4% 5,525 68.8% 2,505 31.2%
Denmark 6,630 3.6% 5,405 81.5% 1,225 18.5%
Belgium 4,770 2.6% 2,405 50.4% 2,385 50.0%
Sweden 3,310 1.8% 2,620 79.2% 690 20.8%
Finland 2,100 1.1% 1,790 85.2% 310 14.8%
Portugal 1,750 1.0% 920 52.6% 830 47.4%
Greece 1,900 1.0% 1,045 55.0% 855 45.0%
Ireland 790 0.4% 525 66.5% 245 31.0%
Luxembourg 280 0.2% 165 58.9% 115 41.1%
EU-15 Total 183,220 100.0% 127,155 69.4% 56,065 30.6%
2004
Country Total  
Turnover 
 (€ million)
% of EU-15 Pollution 
Mgmt  
(€ million) 
 % of total 
turnover 
Resource 
Mgmt             
(€ million)
% of total 
turnover 
Germany 66,114 30.9% 44,597 67.5% 21,517 32.5%
France 45,851 21.5% 28,264 61.6% 17,587 38.4%
UK 21,224 9.9% 12,103 57.0% 9,121 43.0%
Italy 19,269 9.0% 8,946 46.4% 10,323 53.6%
Netherlands 14,039 6.6% 10,953 78.0% 3,086 22.0%
Austria 10,091 4.7% 9,092 90.1% 999 9.9%
Spain 9,044 4.2% 6,047 66.9% 2,997 33.1%
Denmark 8,794 4.1% 6,542 74.4% 2,252 25.6%
Belgium 5,806 2.7% 2,785 48.0% 3,021 52.0%
Sweden 3,968 1.9% 3,090 77.9% 878 22.1%
Finland 3,543 1.7% 1,414 39.9% 2,129 60.1%
Portugal 2,356 1.1% 1,069 45.4% 1,287 54.6%
Greece 2,054 1.0% 1,266 61.6% 788 38.4%
Ireland 1,211 0.6% 818 67.5% 393 32.5%
Luxembourg 319 0.1% 198 62.1% 121 37.9%
EU-15 Total 213,683 100.0% 137,184 64.2% 76,499 35.8%
Table 4 EU-15 eco-industry sizes from 1999 and 2004 (based on ECOTEC 2002 and Ernst & Young 2006)
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Figure 5 Country specific growth of the eco-industry between 1999 and 2004 at constant prices  























































































ECOTEC (2002) uses demand for environmental 
protection goods and services to estimate the 
size of the industry in the EU-15 Member States 
and candidate countries. According to these esti-
mates, the eco-industries of the EU-15 supplied 
€185 bn of goods and services in 1999, while the 
pollution management and cleaner technologies 
sectors contributed €127 bn and the resource 
management sector €58 bn.
Candidate countries (CC-13) supplied €10.3 bn of 
goods and services a year in pollution manage-
ment, on which an average share of 1.9% GDP 
had been spent (ECOTEC 2002).
According to the study by Ernst & Young (2006), 
total turnover in the EU-25 eco-industries 
amounted to €227 bn in 2004, with the EU-15 
generating a total of €214 bn (94%). Pollution 
management contributed €144.9 bn and resource 
management €81.8 bn.
Ernst & Young (2006) stated that the turnover 
increased in total by about 7% in the EU-15 
between 1999 and 2004 (measured in constant 
prices). Based on the data in table 4, this figure 
cannot be reproduced as information on the 
underlying inflation rates is missing. The country-
specific growth of the eco-industry is presented 
in figure 5:
In terms of turnover, the largest sectors in the 
EU’s eco-industry are water supply, wastewater 
treatment and solid waste management. Waste 
water treatment and waste management each 
account for about one-third of the pollution man-
agement sector (Ernst & Young 2006). 
In both survey periods, 50% of the total EU-15 
turnover was generated by the eco-industries of 
Germany and France (table 4).
Based on different classifications of the eco- 
industry, Jänicke & Zieschank (2008) claim that 
the resource management and cleaner technolo-
gies sectors have a larger market share than the 
pollution control and end-of-pipe technolo-
gies sectors. They underline the high growth of 
resource management in comparison to tradi-
tional pollution control. Jänicke & Zieschank 
challenge Ernst & Young (2006) because, according 
to them, some figures have not been included and 
others were estimated too low. Thus, Jänicke & 
Zieschank (2008) estimate the total turnover of the 
EU-25 to be at least €270 bn (2.6% of the GDP). 
According to the German consultancy Berger (2008), 
the performance of Germany’s eco-industry was 
significantly underestimated by ECOTEC (2002) and 
Ernst & Young (2006). For 2005, Berger estimated 
a significantly higher turnover of €150 bn (see 
Source Estimated jobs Region examined  Timeframe Other consideration
University of California, 
2008. “Energy Efficiency, 
Innovation, and Job 
Creation in California.”
1,500,000 California 1977-2007
Resulting from energy 
efficiency policies
403,000 California 2008-2020
Efficiency and climate-action 
driven jobs taking into account 
the potential for innovation
US Metro Economics, 2008. 
“Current and Potential 
Green Jobs in the US 
Economy.”
750,000 US 2006
By increasing renewable use 
and implementing efficiency 
measures
2,500,000 US 2008-2018
By increasing renewable use 
and implementing efficiency 
measures
4,200,000 US 2008-2038
By increasing renewable use 
and implementing efficiency 
measures
Political Economy  
Research, 2008. “A Program 
to Create Good Jobs & Start 
Building a Low-Carbon 
Economy.”
2,000,000 US Potential
Based on spending $100 billion 
in public funds in a “green” 
recovery program
Barack Obama, 2008. Energy 
and Economic Policies.
5,000,000 US 2008-2018 Based on $150 billion stimulus
Gordon Brown, 2008. UK 
Renewable Program. 
160,000 US 2008-2020 Based on £100 billion stimulus
25,000,000 Worldwide 2050 -
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chapter 3.3.1). Some factors are quantified by 
Jänicke & Zieschank (2008): for instance, a relatively 
high figure estimated at €40 bn for eco-construction 
(retro-fitting) had not been considered, nor industries 
like eco-tourism and green financing. In addition, 
the estimates for renewable energy were too low 
(€12.3 bn in 2004 instead of €2.2 bn). This is twice 
as much as the estimate for the EU-25 (€6.1 bn) 
(Jänicke & Zieschank 2008).
3.2.2 Employment in eco-industries
Several studies and estimations of green jobs 
worldwide and for specific regions have been 
made. To interpret these studies, the statistical 
difficulties in isolating eco-industries described 
above have to be borne in mind. In this context, it 
is not intended to present final quantitative data 
and results. Instead, the existing scattered and 
partly incomparable approaches are presented 
as robust indicators that the macroeconomic 
development of eco-industries is positive and 
promising. An overview of these studies and 
estimates are summarised in the following table:
According to UNEP (2008), the prospects for green 
employment are very positive. Wind and solar 
power are expected to create more than 8 million 
jobs within the next 20 years. Other major poten-
tial can be realised in the construction of energy-
efficient buildings and the retro-fitting of existing 
ones, as well as moving from conventional to 
more sustainable farming. Furthermore, the 
introduction of modern public transport systems in 
regions where no system or only an old, inefficient 
one currently exists could create considerable 
employment. Finally, the expansion of recycling 
and remanufacturing measures throughout the 
production chain has significant potential.
More specific studies of the employment situation 
in eco-industries have been made on behalf of 
the European Commission. Ernst & Young (2006) 
identified about 3.4 million full-time direct and 
indirect employees (equivalents) in Europe in 2004, 
with 2.3 million jobs in the pollution management 
sector and about 1 million in the resource man-
agement sector. Waste water treatment and solid 
waste management account for about 77% of 
employment in the pollution management sector - 
some 1.77 million jobs (Ernst & Young 2006). 
Table 5 Overview of studies and estimates conducted on the job creation potential of a green stimulus (DWS 2008, p. 6)
33A Green New Deal for Europe
Table 6 EU-15 eco-industry employment from 1999 and EU-25 eco-industry employment from 2004 
(based on ECOTEC 2002 and Ernst & Young 2006)
EU-15 1999
Sector Direct Indirect









Air Pollution Control  30,300 80,700 111,000 50,400 161,400
Waste Water Treatment 209,100 218,500 427,600 132,200 559,800
Solid Waste Management 696,300 64,000 760,300 144,300 904,600
Remediation & Clean Up 15,100 8,000 23,100 17,700 40,800
Noise & Vibration 21,800 7,000 28,800 3,500 32,300
Environmental Administration 66,500 9,100 75,600 26,100 101,700
R&D 25,900 2,400 28,300 3,300 31,600








t Water Supply 208,800 88,100 296,900 135,300 432,200
Recycled Materials 223,600 10,900 234,500 46,200 280,700
Nature Protection 66,700 33,100 99,800 22,600 122,400
Total 499,100 132,100 631,200 204,100 835,300
Grand Total 1,564,100 521,800 2,085,900 581,600 2,667,500
EU-25 2004
Sector Direct Indirect









Air Pollution Control  31,718 88,113 119,831 58,926 178,757
Waste Water Treatment 387,547 209,245 596,792 203,355 800,147
Solid Waste Management 774,976 68,329 843,305 165,184 1,008,489
Remediation & Clean Up 21,176 14,763 35,939 25,026 60,965
Noise & Vibration 20,763 9,320 30,083 3,235 33,318
Environmental Administration 178,117 39,710 217,827 51,031 268,858
R&D - - - - -








t Water Supply - - - - 502,000
Recycled Materials - - - - 439,000
Nature Protection - - - - 100,000
Total - - - - 1,041,000
Grand Total 3,391,534
Figures are presented for direct and indirect 
employment. Further differentiations are made 
between employment created by spending on 
operations (OPEX) and investment-related expend-
iture (CAPEX). Indirect employment is mostly 
generated by spending on operations.
According to the studies by ECOTEC (2002) and 
Ernst & Young (2006), estimations of employment 
varied considerably between 1999 and 2004. 
Direct employment in pollution management 
increased from 1.45 million jobs in 1999 (EU-15) 
to 1.85 million jobs in 2004 (EU-25). Direct 
employment in resource management activities 
increased from 0.6 million jobs in 1999 (EU-15) to 
1.04 million jobs in 2004 (EU-25).
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Country  Jobs   %  Jobs  %   Jobs  % Jobs %
Germany 373,800 24% 128,700 25% 148,900 26% 651,500 24%
France 337,300 22% 64,700 12% 122,800 21% 524,800 20%
UK 264,100 17% 115,600 22% 85,800 15% 465,500 17%
Italy 126,500 8% 42,400 8% 46,600 8% 215,600 8%
Netherlands 84,200 5% 55,400 11% 34,200 6% 173,900 7%
Austria 90,300 6% 18,900 4% 35,600 6% 144,900 5%
Spain 72,200 5% 14,200 3% 26,100 4% 112,500 4%
Denmark 62,500 4% 18,100 3% 26,300 5% 106,900 4%
Belgium 31,500 2% 20,900 4% 11,900 2% 64,300 2%
Sweden 39,400 3% 10,000 2% 13,500 2% 63,000 2%
Finland 31,300 2% 11,100 2% 10,500 2% 52,900 2%
Portugal 24,300 2% 8,700 2% 9,000 2% 42,000 2%
Greece 16,700 1% 8,500 2% 6,300 1% 31,500 1%
Ireland 7,600 0% 3,600 1% 2,900 0% 14,100 1%
Luxembourg 2,300 0% 800 0% 800 0% 3,900 0%
EU-15 Total 1,564,100 100% 521,600 100% 581,300 100% 2,667,300 100%
Nevertheless, the results presented in these two 
studies should be viewed with caution because 
ECOTEC (2002) only presented data for the EU-
15, whereas Ernst & Young provided data for the 
EU-25. Differences in turnover, countries’ wage 
rates or other production factors can also have a 
significant effect on the model used.
A country-specific breakdown is unfortunately 
only supplied in the ECOTEC (2002) study, as dis-
played in table 7.
The German eco-industry has the highest share of 
employment, with almost one-quarter of the total 
jobs in 1999. In contrast to the results for Germany 
provided by ECOTEC (2002) and by Ernst & Young 
(2004), BMU (2005) provides figures of 1,412,400 
employees in 1998 and 1,459,100 in 2002 (both 
OPEX and CAPEX) – more than double the amounts 
suggested by ECOTEC and Ernst & Young. This 
may be another indication of an underestimation 
– at least of Germany’s eco-industries.
It is interesting to note that the American Solar 
Energy Society (ASES) and Management Infor-
mation Services (MISI) are estimating a gross 
potential of 16 million jobs by 2030 in the renewable 
industry sector alone. The renewable energy 
sector has performed better in EU Member 
States, especially Germany, with more jobs created 
in the industry and much faster than in the US. 
The ASES and MISI are concerned that the US 
renewable energy industry will not be able to catch 
up with the European market without further 
investments (ASES & MSI 2009). Consequently, 
the US has already made some major invest-
ments in renewable energies. In 2008 and early 
2009, it made the highest new capacity invest-
ment of $24bn – 20% of total global investments. 
US investment in wind energy in 2008 surpassed 
that of Germany, the world’s former champion 
in wind energy capacity. In 2008, the US and the 
European Union both invested more in renewa-
ble energy capacities than in conventional energy 
capacities (Martinot et al. 2009).
3.3 Example: Eco-Industries in  
Germany
The evidence presented on the eco-industries’ 
turnover and employment highlights the out-
standing importance of the German eco-indus-
try. Germany will therefore be examined in more 
detail in the following section. This will also shed 
light on the political and economic drivers of eco-
innovation, which will be dealt with in chapter 3.4 
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and which are of central importance for a Green 
New Deal with a lasting impact on social, eco-
nomic and environmental conditions.
3.3.1 Characteristics of the German  
eco-industries
According to recent assessments by the German 
Federal Ministry of Environment (BMU 2009a), 
the German environmental industry is booming 
and will continue to grow: 40% of all companies 
in the sector realised annual growth rates of 10% 
between 2004 and 2006. More than 5% of German 
industrial production consists of environmen-
tal goods. From 2005 to 2007, overall production 
in the eco-industry grew by a total of 27%. The 
strong development of the environmental 
industry in Germany also had an influence on the 
labour market. Companies in the environmental 
sector registered an average increase of 15% in 
their workforces between 2004 and 2006 (BMU 
2009a).
In 2006, 4.5% of all German employees worked 
in the eco-industry almost 1.8 million people. 
Between 2004-2006, the sector generated 300,000 
additional jobs (BMU 2009a). 
Surveys of German eco-industry companies 
showed that turnover is expected to increase 
considerably in the coming years, especially in 
renewable energies and renewable resources. 
In the medium term (2030), the environmental 
industry is expected to out-perform traditional 
German manufacturing industries like machine 
and vehicle construction (Berger 2008). Germany 
already has a 16% share of the global trade in 
environmental goods and is gaining importance 
in global markets (BMU 2009a). 
Based on Berger (2008), the following six lead 
markets have been identified:
• Sustainable energy production 
Overall global market potential is estimated 
to double by 2020. Gas and steam technologies 
will maintain constant growth. The global market 
for solar thermal and photovoltaics will grow 
annually by about 20%. In 2020, the market for 
fuel cells will be ten times its current size, worth 
€75,000 mn. Renewable energies will see the 
most dynamic developments. The main focus of 
the industry until 2020 will be Central and East-
ern Europe.
•  Energy  efficiency
The global energy efficiency market is the lead 
market, currently worth €450,000 mn and 
expected to double by 2020. German companies 
will have a 20% share of that market, with North 
America and industrialised European markets 
remaining the biggest international markets.
• Resource and material efficiency 
The lead market resource- and material efficiency 
has the biggest share of investment in R&D. In 
Germany, overall resource use for production is 
estimated to have a reduction potential of 20% up 
to 2016, which is equivalent to a cost-reduction 
potential of €27,000 mn per annum.
• Circular economy 
The global market for technologies in the waste 
and recycling economy is estimated to be worth 
€30,000 mn, growing to about €46,000 mn in 
2020. German companies should have at least 
25% of this market.
• Sustainable water management 
The sustainable water management lead market 
is expected to be worth €0.48 bn until 2020, while 
the waste water management market is worth 
an estimated €12,000 mn, with high potential for 
further growth. Germany is the market leader, 
with a 40% share in the decentralised water man-
agement sector.
• Sustainable mobility 
The sustainable mobility lead market is worth 
€0.18 bn and this can be doubled by 2020. Only 
moderate growth is expected in the market 
for fuel-efficient engines, but the market for 
bio fuels and exhaust gas filters is predicted to 
have an annual growth rate of 20% until 2020. 
Mature markets like traffic detection systems are 
expected to enjoy annual growth rates of 7% until 
2020.
According to Berger (2008), the emerging Asian 
and East European markets will become more 
important. German companies are also expect-
ing sales markets in Central and Eastern Europe 
to gain the same importance as West European 
markets. Markets in India, China and Russia will 
be far larger than those in North America and 
Japan. African sales markets will also become 
important for the energy efficiency market up 
until 2020.
36
3.3.2 The co-evolution of environmental policy 
and eco-industries in Germany
Germany is the world’s leading supplier of envi-
ronmental technology and services, thanks to an 
environmental policy shaped over generations 
since the late 1960s. Until now, some of the most 
densely populated and polluted regions in the 
world have been in Germany. The coal mining and 
steel-producing industries along the Ruhr caused 
serious environmental pollution, and a systematic 
environmental clean-up marked the start of a still-
evolving “green” policy, as well as a highly com-
petitive eco-industry in Germany (von Weizsäcker 
1994, Jänicke 2003; Bleischwitz 2007). 
The development of eco-industries generally 
depends on having a strong modern state which 
is able to set and enforce high environmental 
standards. Therefore, this industry depends on 
political will, commonly shared perspectives and 
continuous credible political efforts. In Germany, 
a broad environmental movement contributed to 
a societal consensus, which was also reflected in 
the different political parties. Over four decades, 
this broad political consensus helped to estab-
lish the necessary networks of state, industry, 
science and society which are needed for eco-
innovation. Jänicke & Zieschank (2008) mention 
several examples of successful sector-specific 
programmes for environmental technology in 
Germany: 
• Low-Energy Buildings 
In 1998, the federal red-green coalition of the Social 
Democrats and the Greens established a policy to 
improve the energy efficiency of buildings as part 
of its climate programme. The approach was a 
combination of specific regulations and market 
instruments. Binding energy efficiency stand-
ards (insulation, heating systems) have been 
introduced. Old, existing and new buildings have 
to fulfil these efficiency standards. An eco-tax and 
market-incentive programmes have also been 
introduced. Fossil fuels became more expensive 
and financial support was given for low-energy 
houses by the state-owned bank “Kreditanstalt 
für Wiederaufbau” (Jänicke & Zieschank 2008). 
As a result of this policy mix and an overall in-
crease in energy prices, the market for low- 
energy houses in Germany has been growing 
fast. Heating energy use in Germany was reduced 
by about 20% between 1996 and 2005 (SRU 2005). 
Altogether, €40 bn was invested in energy- 
efficient buildings in 2005 in Germany (Jänicke & 
Zieschank 2008).
• Fuel-Efficient Diesel Cars 
In 1997, a differentiation in the car tax was intro-
duced, which supported fuel-efficient cars with 
a tax bonus. Diesel engines with direct fuel 
injection are the only ones to meet these stricter 
targets. The eco-tax on fuel introduced in 1999 
worked well together which this tax bonus. In 
1999, diesel cars which consume of 3 or 5l/100km 
were launched onto the market. This led to not 
only to the successful establishment of fuel-ef-
ficient diesel cars, but also a decrease in fuel con-
sumption. As a result, Germany is the lead market 
for fuel-efficient diesel cars (Jänicke & Zieschank 
2008).
• Recycling
Increased market prices for resources have been 
a financial incentive to reduce the use of primary 
resources as well as boosting reuse and recycling. 
Trade in secondary resources has also become 
more profitable, and Germany also introduced a 
recycling policy in 1994, updated in 2001 to prohibit 
land filling without pre-treatment until 2005. 
As a result, recycling rates increased and the 
amount of final disposal to landfill decreased from 
63.5 million tonnes in 1998 to 45.7 million tonnes in 
2005 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2007). Since 2000 
there has been a significant decoupling of GNP 
growth and waste generation (Berger 2008). 
In addition, emissions of green house gases have 
been cut (40 million tonnes CO2 equivalent com-
pared to 1990) mainly by decommissioning land- 
fill sites (BMU 2006). An economic effect of the 
policy was a significant growth of the waste and 
recycling sector. The waste industry currently has 
a turnover of €50 bn and accounts for 250,000 
jobs. Between 2004 and 2006, the recycling 
sector had an annual 13% growth in turnover and 
9% growth in employment (Berger 2008).
• Renewable Energies 
Rising oil prices and the eco-tax on fossil fuels 
supported the development of renewable ener-
gies. A major instrument was obligatory feed-
in-tariffs for renewable electricity. These already 
existed in the 1990s (Electricity Feed In Act 1990), 
but were strengthened through the Renewable 
Energy Resources Act in 1998. €4.19 bn of rev-
enues generated by fees were realised in 2005, 
which resulted in the 3% increase in electricity 
costs for households (Berger 2008, BMU 2006). 
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On top of the feed-in-tariffs, another finan-
cial incentive has been introduced. The “Market 
Incentive Programme” 2000-2004 supported 
investment in renewable energies with an amount 
of €665.4 mn. The state-owned bank “Kreditan-
stalt für Wiederaufbauf” (KfW) financed alterna-
tive heating in buildings to the tune of €350 mn in 
2008 and an expected amount of €500 mn in 2009 
(Jänicke & Zieschank 2008). 
The effect of this policy was remarkable. A doubling 
of renewable power production from 19 to 37 TWh/a 
took place from 1991 to 2001. Another doubling of 
production to 73 TWh/a in 2006 was achieved in half 
that time. The growth rate is still increasing, with 
production rising to 86,7 TWh/a in 2007 (Jänicke 
& Zieschank 2008) and 58 million tonnes of CO2 
emissions were cut in 2007 (BEE 2008), making this 
mix of instruments the most effective in terms of 
climate protection (Berger 2008). 
The economic effect included turnover in the 
renewable energy sector in 2004 of €12.3 bn. 
Turnover in 2007 was already €25 bn, with a 
direct and indirect gross job impact of 250,000 
jobs (Jänicke & Zieschank 2008).
3.4 Economic and political drivers of 
eco-innovation
In a major study of the eco-industry in the EU, 
Ernst & Young (2006) identified five key market 
drivers for the environmental industry: 
•  compliance with EU and Member States’ legal 
requirements and policy objectives such as  
water quality standards or a threshold for a 
minimum ratio of renewable energy production;
•  the development of technologies and emerging 
new market segments or solutions, such as 
monitoring of new pollutants or the cleaning-up 
of former industrial sites;
•  market incentives to enable the 
competitiveness of environmental industries 
to compare with that of conventional 
industries, such as fair pricing based on the 
internalisation of environmental externalities;
•  the availability of public funding for co-financing 
investments in the environmental industry;
•  consumer awareness of the special character 
of environmental products and technologies, 
their very existence and their benefits to 
consumers.
Ernst & Young conclude that “compliance with 
policy objectives and legal requirements set 
by EU and national authorities will be the main 
drivers of eco-industry growth in the near future” 
(Ernst & Young 2006, p. 48). 
Jänicke (2008) identifies the following conditions as 
necessary to support environmental innovations:
•  objectives that are clear, demanding and 
calculable;
•  a combination of economic instruments 
like eco-taxation and CO2 emissions trading 
in order to encourage a general trend, 
and regulation in order to realise specific 
innovation potential (“hybrid instrumentation”);
•  all phases of the innovation process have to 
be supported by a policy mix that also covers 
additional instruments such as labelling and 
networking.
Jänicke & Zieschank (2008) identify a combina-
tion of financial instruments such as the envi-
ronmental tax reform and specific regulations 
like the Top-Runner-Programme in Japan as 
being a very effective approach for environmental 
innovations.
The significance of the price mechanism has 
been confirmed by the impact on technology of 
high energy prices today and in the 1970s. 
A more systematic overview of the drivers of, 
and barriers to, eco-innovation can be found 
in Bleischwitz (2007) and Bleischwitz et al. 
(2009a). According to Bleischwitz et al. (2009a, 
p. 26), drivers of eco-innovation are “specific and 
evident agents or factors leading to increased or 
reduced pressure on the environment. Barriers 
can be considered as those forms of marked 
imperfections that hinder markets from adopting 
eco-innovations. Both can be viewed either from 




Technological and management capabilities
Appropriation problem and market characteristics
Path dependencies (inefficient production systems, knowledge accumulation)
Demand side
(Expected) market demand (demand pull hypothesis): state, consumers and firms
Social awareness of the need for clean production, environmental consciousness 
and preference for environmentally friendly products
Institutional and  
political influences
Environmental policy (incentive based instruments or regulatory approaches).
Fiscal systems (pricing of eco-innovative goods and services)
Institutional structure: e.g. political opportunities of environmentally oriented 
groups, organization of information flow, existence of innovation networks
International agreements
Kristof and Hennicke (2009) recommend a com-
bination of a broad range of instruments to steer 
eco-innovation. They propose a mix of:
•  economic incentives and market-based  
instruments; 
• a reduction in counter-productive subsidies; 
• legislation; 
• financing innovation; 
• marketing and diffusion; and 
• networking, information and education.
 
3.5 Intermediate result
Insufficient data and unclear definitions of the eco-
industry result in rather fuzzy outcomes in studies 
on the current situation in the EU eco-industry.
Table 4 presents data from ECOTEC (2002) and 
Ernst & Young (2006). On the basis of this data, 
total growth of 7% between 1999 and 2004 was 
identified at constant prices, resulting in a rather 
low annual growth rate of about 1.5%. Berger 
(2008) cites Ernst & Young (2006) with an annual 
growth of 7% in the industry, which suggests a 
Table 8 Drivers of eco-innovation (Bleischwitz 2009 based on Horbach 2005)
much higher growth than the figures presented 
by Ernst & Young (2006).
Jänicke & Zieschank (2008) have shown that 
ECOTEC (2002) and Ernst & Young (2006) both 
underestimated the size of eco-industry. They 
rather suggest a total EU-25 turnover of at least 
€270 bn in 2004 (2.6% of GDP) compared with the 
€227 bn identified by Ernst & Young (2006).
The true employment potential of the EU’s eco-
industry is difficult to assess. Major studies 
like that of UNEP (2008) can only present some 
quantitative figures and provide rough estimates. 
Nevertheless, findings from The Political 
Economy Research Institute of the University of 
Massachusetts Amherst (PERI 2008) suggest that 
investments in the eco-industry have a higher job-
creating potential than other sectors: PERI argues 
that the greatest job-creation potential would be 
realised through “green” stimulus. According 
to their calculations, the employment-creation 
potential of a €75 bn green stimulus programme 
in the US would be 935,200 direct jobs, 586,000 
indirect jobs and 496,000 induced jobs (PERI 
2008). For comparison, they calculated scenarios 
with the same spending in the household 
consumption sector and the oil industry, with the 
results displayed in the following figure: 
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Spending in Oil Industry
Figure 6 Total job creation through €75 ($100) billion in spending (based on PERI 2008)
Green recovery programmes apparently have 
larger job-creation potential than programmes 
which are based on measures to increase con-
ventional household consumption (PERI 2008). 
The direct job-creation effect of green invest-
ment is outlined by UNEP (2008) by analysing 
individual cases. For example, the construc-
tion of 6,100 compressed natural gases buses in 
India is expected to create 18,000 jobs (DWS 2008; 
UNEP 2008). Based on a study of the year 2000, 
the UK government assumes that for every €1 
mn invested in residential energy efficiency, 11.3 
to 13.5 full-time jobs have been created. A simi-
lar case study in Germany suggests that €3.8 
bn of public investment and €15.2 bn of private 
investment in energy efficiency retro-fits resulted 
in about 145,000 jobs. 
A more systematic assessment of the impact on 
employment of different Green New Deal meas-
ures would have to be based on econometric 
modelling. Until now, no such modelling evidence 
has been presented.
Turnover and jobs in eco-industries depend heavily 
on environmental policy. Developments in 
Germany have shown how continuous environ-
mental policy can positively influence the devel-
opment of a competitive eco-industry. 
The most important factors for supporting eco-
innovations and their dissemination are:
• ambitious policy objectives; 
• binding legal requirements; 
•  the power and the political will to enforce  
legislation;
•  public funding for co-financing the development 
and procurement of eco-innovation;
• reductions in counter-productive subsidies;
• market-based instruments;
•  the capacity to develop and apply appropriate 
technological solutions;
•  networking, information and training,
 
Political measures need to be launched in a 
synchronised way in a harmonised policy mix. 
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4. Outlines of a Green New Deal in the EU
Recovery packages should stimulate and stabi-
lise the economy when private demand is lack-
ing. A successful recovery package could achieve 
multiplier effects. This means that direct govern-
mental investments could create and stimulate 
self-sustaining markets, leading to structural 
change. This multiplier effect should be used for 
targeted support for European eco-industries. 
Definition
Based on the previous chapters, we can attempt 
a simple definition of a Green New Deal: it is tar-
geted state investment in activities which pro-
duce goods and services to measure, prevent, 
limit, minimise or correct environmental damage 
to water, air and soil, as well as problems related 
to waste, noise and eco-systems. This includes 
innovation in cleaner technologies, products and 
services that reduce environmental risk and min-
imise pollution and resource use. 
Delineation
In contrast to the definition used in other studies 
and commentaries, green stimuli are about more 
than creating a low carbon economy. They must 
promote eco-industries with a clear vision of a 
green modernisation of the economy encompass-
ing the complete industrial system of the European 
Union. With a focus on short-term state investments, 
a Green New Deal can by no means include all the 
instruments needed for a green modernisation, as 
policies for a fundamental and long-term reshaping 
of society and the economy are excluded from this 
definition. Nevertheless, combined with a policy-
mix for a short-term economic stimulus, it can pave 
the way for a fundamental change in consumption 
and production patterns. A Green New Deal can 
therefore be nothing more, but also nothing less, 
than a framework for political action to stimulate 
eco-innovation during the current election period 
from 2009-2014.
Functions
State investments in eco-industries are not 
enough for a Green New Deal, because even eco-
nomic growth in eco-industries can be harmful 
if it merely contributes to increasing an already 
unsustainably high level of natural resource 
consumption. Thus a Green New Deal needs 
to be more than a technology platform for eco- 
industries. It has to be guided by a vision of what 
EU consumption and production patterns should 
look like in the long run. Therefore, a Green New 
Deal requires structural change on all policy 
levels fulfilling three functions. It should: 
1. Break up unsustainable structures
2. Build up sustainable structures
3. Give the right mid- to long-term orientation.
© iStockphoto.com/Hans F. Meier
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Orientation
Our definition of a Green New Deal implies 
that it is a targeted attempt to stimulate eco-
innovation. What should be the target and long-
term orientation?
A Green New Deal should not create an artificial 
market which collapses after subsidies recede. 
It needs to realise potential which already exists 
within the European Union, which has the poten-
tial to provide guiding indicators for an ecological 
modernisation. Official Eurostat figures reveal 
a large development gap between EU Member 
States in terms of resource efficiency. As will be 
explained in the following section, the EU can 
gain considerable environmental and competitive 
advantages if it addresses the existing resource 
productivity gap systematically. This would entail 
the promotion of the existing resource policies of 
the frontrunners and leap-frogging strategies for 
regions which are lagging behind.
In addition to integrated solutions to promote 
overall resource efficiency in the EU, traditional 
eco-industries should also have a place. Regional 
development strategies with a combination of 
integrated and end-of-pipe solutions should be 
designed within the European Union to allow 
implementation of the acquis communautaire in 
combination with an increase in overall resource 
efficiency. Experience with these adapted strate-
gies could also allow for improved international 
development cooperation, because traditional 
areas of environmental protection such as pol-
lution control are very important in developing 
and emerging industrial economies; for example, 
water sanitation. According to the World Health 
Organization (2009)2 “around 1.1 billion people 
globally do not have access to improved water 
supply sources whereas 2.4 billion people do not 
have access to any type of improved sanitation 
facility. About 2 million people die every year due 
to diarrheal diseases, most of them are children 
less than 5 years of age”. In particular, French 
leadership in the water treatment sector could 
be further developed and strengthened. In more 
advanced economies, a Green New Deal would 
be directed more towards integrated solutions 
and investments in resource efficiency. An ideal 
combination would be to integrate the notion of 
resource efficiency in traditional end-of-pipe 
technologies, for example, by offering adapted 
decentralised and resource-efficient water sani-
tation technologies. 
Quick start towards resource efficiency
The European Union is a complex multi-level 
governance system. Political compromise is often 
difficult to achieve, especially when linked to a 
substantial allocation of funds. If the EU had to 
strike a fundamentally “New Deal”, it is quite 
unlikely that it could dedicate substantial funds to 
this and ensure they are spent effectively within 
the very short timeframe of the current recovery 
plans. Therefore, a central strategic question is: 
could a Green New Deal work with the existing 
strategies and instruments of the European 
Union? What objectives, targets and timetables 
accompanied by monitoring mechanisms 
would be needed? What arsenal of research, 
technological and financial instruments and 
programmes is required? 
To answer these questions, we will attempt a 
quick scan of central EU strategies, programmes 
and policies which would be affected by a Green 
New Deal. Thus we will not identify all of them, 
just central entry points for a Green New Deal:
1. Strategies which define the broad economic 
guidelines of EU socio-economic policies.
2. Policies which determine how the EU budget is 
spent on structural interventions in EU economies.
3. Programmes which have the potential to 
stimulate eco-innovation.
4.1 Strategies for a Green New Deal
A strategy is a plan of action designed to achieve a 
particular goal. This means that the goals are key 
in deciding whether EU strategies are consistent 
with a Green New Deal. Usually, the objectives of 
political strategies are quantified by indicators. To 
determine what kind of green deal could become 
part of broader EU strategies, a decision is needed 
on whether a Green New Deal’s primary objective 
of stimulating eco-innovation could be measured 
using the indicators guiding the strategies, and 
if not, what indicators would have to be added or 
adapted.
2   http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/hygiene/en/index.html
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4.1.1 Lisbon Strategy
The EU’s paramount development strategy is the 
Lisbon Strategy. Adopted in March 2000 at the 
European Council in Lisbon, the strategy aims to 
make the EU the world’s most competitive know-
ledge-based economy by 2010, with sustainable 
economic growth, more and better employment 
opportunities and greater social cohesion. 
Quantitative targets and timetables complement 
the Lisbon vision. So-called structural indicators 
for monitoring socio-economic progress devel-
oped into a central instrument of indicator-based 
political control in the European Union to improve 
decision-making and assessment. In its Commu-
nication on the structural indicators of November 
2000 (COM (2000) 594), the European Commis-
sion explains that the choice of the indicators was 
based on previous procedures. Most of the indi-
cators had already been presented in the frame-
work of the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines”. 
The structural indicators are used for two 
purposes (COM (2000) 594, p. 5):
1. Monitoring progress both in achieving the iden-
tified targets and in implementing policies. 
2. Assessing the effectiveness of policies.
In its communication, the Commission admits 
that the first goal can be achieved rather easily, 
but evaluating the performance of measures will 
be a greater challenge, since it is based on an 
understanding of the relationship between action 
and measured results. 
There is a tension between simplification and dif-
ferentiation. On the one hand, indicators have 
great advantages (COM (2000) 594, p. 6): “Simple 
and objective quantitative policy and performance 
indicators can play an important role in highlight-
ing problems, measuring progress in achieving 
the targets identified, guiding policy makers in 
their policy efforts, and focusing public attention 
on what is at stake”. On the other hand, the evalu-
ation has to take place within a coherent frame-
work to avoid over- and misinterpretation. Some 
data are only comparable to a very limited degree.
In March 2001, the Stockholm European Council 
expanded the scope of the structural indicators 
from purely socio-economic objectives to 
sustainability. In particular, the heads of state 
and government wanted to know about the 
contribution that the environment technology 
sector could make to promoting growth and 
employment – a political motivation which is 
obviously compatible with a Green New Deal.
In October 2001, the Commission proposed 
environmental indicators which were approved in 
December 2001 by the European Council in 
Laeken, enabling the Commission to present an 
integrated synthesis report with 42 structural 
indicators in 2002. 
The Laeken meeting also agreed that the envi-
ronmental indicators would need further refine-
ment, so a so-called “open list” with a core set 
of environmental headline indicators was deve-
loped. The integrated environment indicators and 
the open list should be followed up in line with 
the political priorities of the Union. In 2003, the 
Italian Presidency drastically reduced the list of 
42 indicators to 14. Only three indicators (instead 
of seven) should help to monitor the environmen-
tal dimension of the EU Sustainable Development 
Strategy (total greenhouse gas emissions, energy 
intensity of the economy, volume of freight trans-
port relative to GDP). The three indicators chosen 
might not be able to reflect fully sustainable EU 
development, but fortunately the more differen-
tiated list of structural indicators remains intact 
and can be downloaded from the Eurostat server.3 
It helps to assess many social, economic and 
environmental aspects of European integration 
both at national and EU level. This is often con-
nected to international comparisons. Seeing “the 
big picture” might also be necessary with regard 
to the accession of socially, economically and 
ecologically very heterogeneous new Member 
States. Certainly, it could be used as an already-
agreed basis for justifying central aspects of the 
Green New Deal. 
4.1.2 Sustainable Development Strategy
The first Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS) 
was agreed at the European Council in Gothenburg 
in 2001. The objectives and principles adopted 
by the European Council in June 2005 form the 
basis for working towards effective responses to 
global development risks, which are described in 
the revised Sustainable Development Strategy. 
3   http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
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Most of the issues addressed in the SDS are per-
sistent social, economic and environmental prob-
lems which require structural changes in society. 
Therefore, the SDS can be considered to be a 
long-term strategy for the EU.
The renewed Strategy adopted by the European 
Council addresses seven key challenges:
• climate change and clean energy;
• sustainable transport;
• sustainable production and consumption;
• better management of natural resources;
• social inclusion, demography and migration;
• fighting global poverty.
In February 2005, the European Commission 
adopted a set of sustainable development indi-
cators (SDIs) for monitoring the implementation 
of the Sustainable Development Strategy (SDS). 
Eurostat’s sustainable development reporting 
has been influenced by the complex history of 
the sustainability paradigm in the EU. The SDIs 
are largely based on the work of a group of na-
tional experts within a so-called SDI Task Force. 
“With a view to harmonisation and rationalisa-
tion, the SDI Task Force made maximum use of 
existing indicator initiatives, such as those of the 
UN Commission on Sustainable Development 
and OECD, the Structural Indicators, the Laeken 
indicators, indicators monitoring the Cardiff inte-
gration process (agriculture, energy, transport), 
and the core set of indicators of the European 
Environment Agency” (CEC 2005a).
For grouping the total of some 155 SDI, Eurostat 
has proposed a multi-layer system with 3 levels: 
1. The first level contains headline indicators for 
initial policy analysis and monitoring progress 
towards headline policy objectives. They are  
intended for high-level policy makers and the 
general public (see table above). 
2. The second level indicators support evaluation of 
core policy areas and more detailed monitoring  
of progress in achieving headline objectives. 
They are constructed for policy-makers and the 
general public. 
3. Finally, the third level is supposed to be used 
by a more specialised audience for further policy 
analysis and better understanding of the trends 
and complexity of issues associated with the 
themes or interlinkages with other themes in 
the SDI framework. 
The Eurostat SDI and the publication “Measuring 
progress towards sustainable development” 
(Eurostat 2005, 2007) represent best practice in 
indicator-based sustainable development reporting. 
It is comprehensive, well-structured, intelligible and 
illustrated with many graphs. In the report, Eurostat 
assessed trends compared with policy objectives 
to inform the general public and decision-makers 
about achievements, trade-offs and failures in 
attaining the objectives of the strategy. The SDI 
framework is supposed to provide a clear and easily 
communicable structure for assessing policies: 
“Tight policy linkages assure strong user relevance 
and effective utilisation of indicators in decision-
making” (Eurostat 2005, p. 9).
GDP and Decoupling
“It is not enough for us to talk about the dif-
ferent global challenges, as energy, climate 
change, health, security and the environment. 
We need widely accepted communication tools 
that show progress in these fields. And that 
progress can only be measured with suitable 
indicators. So it’s time to go beyond the tools 
developed for the very different world of the 
1930s. (…) It’s time to go beyond GDP”.4 
José Manuel Barroso, President of the European 
Commission
“Business as usual is not an option. We do not 
need more and more resources and energy for 
a good life.” 5 
Angela Merkel, Chancellor, Federal Republic of 
Germany
It is becoming increasingly clear to people that 
if the European institutions want to be serious 
about measuring sustainability, they need to 
move away from crude ratings of economies 
according to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
and move towards a re-definition of progress, 
measuring the value of products and services 
in relation to resource use. 
4   Beyond GDP – opening speech. SPEECH/07/734.
5   Speech at the 7th Annual Conference of the Federal German Sustainability Council, November 2007.
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Figure 7 Decoupling economic activity, resource use and environmental impact (taken from COM (2005) 670)
Decoupling indicators usually set social and 
environmental information in relation to GDP. 
In the OECD report on decoupling indicators, 
31 of these cover a broad spectrum of 
environmental issues; 16 relate to the decoupling 
of environmental pressures from total economic 
activity under the headings of climate change, air 
pollution, water quality, waste disposal, material 
use and natural resources; and 15 indicators focus 
on production and use in four specific sectors: 
energy, transport, agriculture and manufacturing 
(OECD 2003, Goosens et al. 2007). 
The point of departure for this research project 
is the existing SDI headline indicator “resource 
productivity” for sustainable consumption and 
production (SCP). SCP addresses the key SDS 
challenges of sustainable consumption and pro-
duction as well as the conservation and man-
agement of natural resources (Eurostat 2007). 
Resource productivity is measured by dividing 
GDP by Domestic Material Consumption (DMC).6 
DMC and other material flow indicators are rel-
evant for a number of SCP policies, most notably 
the Thematic Strategy for the Sustainable Use 
of Natural Resources (COM (2005) 670). In this 
strategy, the relation between economic activity 
and resource use is at the centre of an elaborated 
work programme with three strategic compo-
nents: (i) knowledge gathering; (ii) policy assess-
ment; and (iii) policy integration. In the resource 
strategy, European Commission expects to 
combine the objective of improving resource 
productivity by decoupling resource use from 
economic activity with the aim of an absolute 
reduction in resource-specific impacts (see fig. 7).
Decoupling sheds empirical light on the often 
fuzzy concept of a “qualitative growth” of an 
economy. For example, decoupling Domestic 
Material Consumption (DMC) and GDP indi-
cates that it is possible to generate economic 
growth by consuming fewer natural resources. 
Research by the Wuppertal Institute for Eurostat 
and the European Environment Agency indicates 
that (relative) decoupling is already taking place 
in the EU, while the European Parliament and 
civil society demand an absolute decoupling of 
economic growth and resource use (Schepel-
mann et al. 2006). 
Decoupling is also at the heart of the OECD 
Environmental Strategy for the First Decade of 
the 21st Century, adopted by OECD Environment 
Ministers in 2001. In the context of SDI, the draft 
of an OECD guide on measuring material flow and 
resource productivity7 should also be mentioned.
By complementing its economic development 
indicators with decoupling indicators related 
to energy and resource consumption (figures 8 
and 9), the European Union could move towards 
becoming not only a competitive, but also a 
resource-efficient, economy.
 6   “Domestic material consumption (DMC) measures the total amount of materials directly used by an economy. It is defined as the annual 
quantity of raw materials extracted from the domestic territory of the focal economy, plus all physical im-ports minus all physical ex-
ports. It is important to note that the term ‘consumption’ as used in DMC denotes ‘apparent consumption’ and not ‘final consumption’. 
DMC does not include upstream hidden flows related to imports and exports of raw materials and products” (Eurostat 2007, p. 102).
7   OECD (2007): Measuring material flow and resource productivity an OECD guide. Draft, ENV/EPOC/SE(2006)1/REV 2, OECD Paris.
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4.1.3 Resource productivity as paramount 
indicator of a GND 
The question is whether the structural indicators 
combined with the SDI can be used for guiding 
and monitoring a Green New Deal, for example 
by guiding innovation policies and establishing 
lead markets. In fact, both indicator systems are 
so broad that they seem to be able to reflect suf-
ficiently different political agendas, including a 
Green New Deal. In fact, their political inconsist-
ency is one of the weaknesses of both indicator 
systems. “In the same way as the Sustainable 
Development Strategy and the Lisbon Strategy 
are related, albeit covering partly different priori-
ties and with different time horizons, the SDI and 
the Structural Indicators sets are responding to 
some slightly different needs but are also in some 
respects overlapping” (CEC 2005a). This overlap 
is symptomatic of a weakness in the Sustainable 
Development Strategy (SDS) and the SDI, which 
indicates a lack of policy coherence. The SDS and 
SDI are supposed to cover economic, social and 
environmental dimensions of sustainable devel-
opment, but so too is the Lisbon Strategy with the 
corresponding Structural Indicators. To improve 
the integration of environmental concerns in 
other policy areas, the Cardiff Strategy has been 
established, and for environmental policy, there 
is the Environmental Action Programme. The status 
of the EU SDS in between the Lisbon Strategy, the 
Cardiff Strategy and the Environmental Action 
Programme is not evident. 
It is not clear why the European Union has 
developed both the Lisbon and the Sustainable 
Development Strategy with indicator systems for 
monitoring social, environmental and economic 
developments. To achieve the necessary policy 
coherence that a Green New Deal would require, 
there are three options: 
•  the relationship between both strategies and 
corresponding indicator system needs better 
and transparent justification; or 
•  one strategy and indicator system needs to be 
abolished; or 
•  both systems should be merged into a 
comprehensive overarching strategy and 
indicator system for (sustainable) social, 
economic and environmental development.
Thus, we may conclude that the indicator sys-
tems seem to reflect complex EU realities rather 
than the simplicity of single political agendas. 
At the same time, both indicator systems are 
far from perfect and need further development. 
To monitor the implementation of green change 
as a consequence of a Green New Deal, they 
could be further harmonised, but central issues 
of the Green New Deal such as modes of trans-
port, energy and material intensity are covered 
by the best available data-sets of Eurostat and 
other European Agencies. Thus the EU has the 
advantage of having at its disposal a central pre-
requisite for a Green New Deal – a complex and 
highly valuable indicator system which could be 
used immediately for monitoring. Nevertheless, 
it is unclear in which direction they should guide 
a Green New Deal. In line with the policy areas 
identified in section 6, the overall guiding objec-
tives could be:
•  a reduction in the energy intensity of the EU 
economy;
•  a reduction in the material intensity of the EU 
economy.
Figures 8 and 9 reveal challenging producti- 
vity gaps within the European Union.8 Com-
pared to average values of the EU-27, the worst 
performer in resource productivity is lagging 
behind by more than a factor of 9(!). With regards to 
energy intensity, the worst performer uses 6 times 
more energy than the EU-27 average in relation 
to GDP. The overall trend is that the economies 
of new EU Member States in particular seem to 
use technologies requiring much more materials 
and energy. In most cases, we may assume that 
these economies tend to waste natural resources. 
This decreases their competitiveness due to 
higher production costs. This also has negative 
implications in the non-productive sectors (e.g. 
households, for example by increasing energy 
bills). An overall improvement in energy and 
materials productivity in these economies would 
not only improve their performance, but would also 
put much less pressure on the environment. For 
example, most of the least productive economies 
rely primarily on fossil energy supplies. Thus, 
increasing energy productivity by a factor of four 
would result in CO2 reductions of about the same 
magnitude. 
8   For an improved comparison the indicators should be reported consistently either in intensity or productivity values.
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The large productivity gap indicates the potential 
for technological leap-frogging strategies in regions 
which are lagging behind. In this context, it is 
important to recognise that successful technological 
leap-frogging depends on three factors: 
1. It must be embedded in a kind of social and  
institutional leap-frogging concerning 
governance and cooperation between science, 
governments and business (“triple helix”). 
2. It should contribute to sustainable 
development in equal partnership between 
efficient and inefficient regions; 
3. It should be closely connected to the acquis 













































































































































































































































































Figure 8 Energy intensity of EU-27 in 2005 (Eurostat)
Figure 9 Resource productivity of EU-27 in 2005 without Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Eurostat) 
*Data for Italy from 2004
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4.2 Policies for a Green New Deal
New and additional policies are necessary to 
implement a Green New Deal that leads to system 
change and eco-innovation. Bleischwitz et al. 
(2009a) have outlined how a policy-mix of regu-
latory, economic and informational instruments 
could promote eco-innovation, but what about 
the current set of EU policies? Could they be a 
basis for effective short-term measures in the 
framework of the Green New Deal? 
The European Commission claims that the 2009 
budget allocated 10% of spending to the environ-
ment :9 “The proposal presented today also high-
lights the growing trend to gear policy spending 
towards the energy and environment, with a mas-
sive 10% of the budget going on environment”.
An analysis of the EU budget shows that a Green 
New Deal in the EU will be determined by whether 
it can manage to green the largest spending 
blocs, which are Regional Policy and the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP). In 2009, CAP spend-
ing will remain around €60 bn and programmes 
supporting cohesion across Europe will receive a 
total of around €50 bn. Thus, regional and agri-
cultural policy still account for almost 80% of the 
EU budget. Although the Commission presents 
rather traditional policies under new headings 
such as “sustainable growth” (Regional Policy) 
and “sustainable management of natural re-
sources” (CAP), it remains to be seen whether 
the largest EU policies can be sufficiently steered 
towards a Green New Deal. 
4.2.1 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP)
Over the past 50 years, the intensification of 
agriculture – often supported by the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) – has increased overall 
pressure on landscapes and biodiversity. Agri- 
culture has contributed to soil degradation, water 
pollution and a loss of biodiversity (EEA 2006). 
Sustainable agro-environmental development 
and cross-compliance schemes show that farm-
ing and protection of the consumer and the 
environment can be harmonised. The CAP can be 
steered towards safeguarding a diversified agri-
cultural sector, taking into account the specific 
territorial characteristics of Europe. This would 
not just aim at increasing agricultural producti-
vity, but also seek to minimise external inputs (e.g. 
of fertilisers or chemicals). A green CAP could 
guarantee quality and food safety through a pro-
ductive reorganisation and a high level of sustain-
able technological innovation. Thus, a greening 
of the CAP can be a potential driver of sustain-
able consumption and production by improving 
the quality of our food while protecting Europe’s 
landscapes and biodiversity.
4.2.2 Regional Policy
From 2007 onwards, half of the regional policy 
budget is being dedicated to the development of 
the new Member States of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Huge financial injections will result in 
structural interventions shaping the long-term 
development of these countries. Schepelmann 
(2005) has shown that regional policy could boost 
sustainable development in the EU. Like no other 
EU policy, it can set a framework for research, 
technological development and the creation of 
markets by connecting public and private drivers 
of a Green New Deal. Regional governments 
can not only use Cohesion Funds to increase the 
overall eco-efficiency of their industry, but also 
to create regional clusters of eco-innovation 
(Schepelmann 2005). Nevertheless, most of the 
funds seem to be dedicated to traditional regional 
economic development schemes. For example, 
large conventional road transport schemes 
will contribute to a long-lasting increase in the 
pressure on the environment. Although most EU 
environment-related spending comes from the 
regional policy budget, it is still primarily dedicated 
to end-of-the pipe environmental protection.
9   http://ec.europa.eu/budget/budget_detail/next_year_en.htm
© iStockphoto.com/Wojtek Kryczka
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4.3 Programmes for a Green New Deal
The European Union already has a number of pro-
grammes dedicated to key parts of a Green New 
Deal: for example, the Seventh Framework Pro-
gramme for research and technological develop-
ment (FP7), the Environmental Technology Action 
Programme or the Competitiveness and Innova-
tion Framework Programme (CIP). The central 
role of these programmes, combined with other 
instruments, has been outlined by Bleischwitz et 
al. (2009a) in a study requested by the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research 
and Energy (ITRE). The following descriptions of 
selected programmes are to a large extent based 
on this study. They show that the EU has already a 
number of policies which address central socio-
economic and technological aspects of the Green 
New Deal.
4.3.1 The Competitiveness and Innovation 
Framework Programme (CIP)
The general aim of the CIP programme is to boost 
the competitiveness and productivity of European 
businesses, and to promote innovation activi-
ties by financing and delivering business support 
services. The main target group is small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and the pro-
gramme period runs from 2007-2013. The total 
budget is €3.6 bn.
The CIP programme is divided into three opera-
tional programmes:
•  Entrepreneurship and Innovation Programme 
(EIP) - €2.17 bn;
•  Information Communication Technologies Policy 
Support Programme (ICT PSP) – €730 mn;
• Intelligent Energy Europe (IEE) - €730 mn.
The ICT PSP is not relevant for a Green New Deal, 
but the other two sub-programmes are.
The Entrepreneurship and Innovation Pro-
gramme’s main objectives are to support SME 
start-ups, cooperation and innovation. Strategies 
include “Eco-innovation” (in the “Eco-innovation/
EIP”), which aims at supporting the first applica-
tion and further market uptake of some of the 
best eco-innovative products. The four priority 
areas are materials recycling, building & construc-
tion, food & drink, greening business & ‘smart’ 
purchasing. EIP is financially the biggest part 
of the CIP by far, accounting for about 60% of 
the total CIP programme. Funds for the Eco- 
innovation/EIP strategy total €0.43 bn of the 
€2.17 bn (i.e. about half the IEE budget). Eco-
innovation/EIP projects are funded with 40% to 
60% of total eligible costs, to help bridge the gap 
between research & development and eco-industries. 
Calls for applications for funding are published 
every year within the programme period.
The Eco-innovation/EIP programme supports 
the first application and further market uptake of 
products and services in eco-industries with high 
potential in Europe, and aims to help overcome 
critical barriers that still hamper their commer-
cial success. Thus it has the potential to be a 
major instrument to support eco-industries.
Intelligent Energy Europe II is the EU’s tool for 
funding action to foster more efficient forms of 
energy production and consumption and the 
adoption of new renewable energy sources. The 
IEE programme does not fund technical RTD 
projects. Existing measures are ‘SAVE’ (energy 
efficiency and rational use of energy), ‘ALTENER’ 
(new and renewable energy sources), ‘STEER’ 
(energy in transport) and integrated initiatives. 
The IEE II Programme is implemented through 
grants (call for proposals or concerted action) 
and procurement (calls for tender). 
IEE measures aim at supporting the use of 
renewable energy sources and the rational use 
of energy. They do not support the development of 
new technologies (see FP7), but rather aim at 
changing the legal and societal framework con-
ditions for initiating a change (optimal implemen-
tation and preparation of legalisation). The work 
programme stresses that projects have to build 
on well-tested strategies and technologies, and 
aim at removing non-technological market barriers 
rather than developing new approaches. ‘Market 
transformation’ and ‘change of behaviour’ are 
frequently used keywords within IEE. Awareness-
raising campaigns and capacity building both 
at the public level and at the level of key stake- 
holders (industry, trade), are a means of achieving 
behavioural changes, and public authorities 
should lead by example.
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4.3.2 The Seventh Framework Programme for 
research and technological development (FP7)
The EU’s Seventh Framework Programme for 
research and technological development (FP7) is the 
largest research programme in the world. It bundles 
all research-related EU initiatives together in 
order to develop the European Research Area 
(ERA) and to reach the goals of the EU’s Lisbon 
Strategy: growth, competitiveness and employ-
ment. During the programme period 2007-2013, 
the FP consists of four basic components: 
1. Cooperation (€32 bn) 
2. Ideas (€7.5 bn), 
3. People (€4.7 bn); and 
4. Capacities (€4.1 bn). 
In addition, there are specific programmes for 
the Joint Research Centre and for the Euratom 
nuclear research and training activities.
Collaborative research constitutes the core of EU 
research funding. Within the ten distinct themes of 
the largest FP7 “cooperation” component (a total 
of €32 bn), several have a strong reference to cen-
tral aspects of a Green New Deal, for example: 
• environment;
• social science and humanities;
• nanoproduction;
• energy;
• food agriculture, fisheries and biotechnology.
The “Environment” work programme aims at 
advancing our knowledge about the links between 
the biosphere, ecosystems and human activity, 
and also developing “new technologies, tools and 
services, in order to address in an integrated way 
global environmental issues”. 
The “Nanoproduction” work programme aims at 
moving from a resource-intensive to a knowledge-
intensive economy. It supports research and 
technological development at the crossroads 
between different disciplines. Research is aimed 
at the product and process level, enforcing the 
generation of high added-value products and 
related processes and technologies. 
The work programme of the “Energy” theme aims 
at transforming the current energy system, for 
example by reducing dependency on imported 
fuels, increasing diversification of energy sources, 
energy efficiency, etc. The work programme focuses 
on technologies identified in the strategic energy 
plan as key challenges for the next 10 years; i.e. 
second generation biofuels (in particular bio- 
refineries), carbon capture and storage, solar 
energy, offshore wind and smart electricity grids.
The work programme for “Food, Agriculture 
and Fisheries, and Biotechnology” is designed 
to contribute to a European Knowledge Based 
Bio-Economy (KBBE), including a ‘sustainable 
use and production of renewable bio-resources’. 
This includes alternative eco-efficient process-
ing routes for established industrial processes 
using biotechnology-enabled approaches. The 
programme requires a substantial contribution 
from industry and should foster innovative break-
throughs in biotechnology applications aimed at 
improving eco-efficiency. 
Energy efficiency is also tackled within SME- 
related research, which aims to help SME associa-
tions to develop technical solutions to problems 
common to a large number of SMEs in specific 
industrial sectors or segments of the value chain. 
Under the 7th Framework Programme, it is 
estimated that up to 30% of the €32 bn budget 
will focus on environmental technologies. This 
includes hydrogen and fuel cells, clean produc-
tion processes, alternative energy sources, CO2 
sequestration, bio-fuels and bio-refineries, energy 
efficiency, information technologies for sustain-
able growth, clean and efficient transport, water 
technologies, soil and waste management, and 
environmentally friendly materials.
The work programmes for the FP7 topics dis-
cussed above mainly aim at the development of 
new green technologies (product level) or new 
production chains (process level). Understand-
ing the economic and social driving forces behind 
unsustainable patterns of natural resources use 
at the system level seem to be underrated, with 
the exception of the social science and humani-
ties work programme (SSH).
4.3.3 Environmental Technology Action Plan 
(ETAP)
Since 2004, the Environmental Technology Action 
Plan (ETAP) has aimed to stimulate the develop-
ment and uptake of environmental technologies 
on a broad scale. It complements the Directorate-
General’s regulatory approaches and directly 
addresses the three dimensions of the Lisbon 
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and Sustainable Development Strategies: growth, 
jobs and the environment.
ETAP’s achievements are reported every two 
years to the European Council and the European 
Parliament. So far, two reports have been made 
available: the first in 2004; the second in 2007.
ETAP consists of a sequence of 28 actions fol-
lowing the order announced in the Commission’s 
Communication on ETAP published on 28 January 
2004. They can be grouped in nine sections:
1. Research and Development (see also FP7) 
2. Technology platforms and public private  
partnerships (PPP)
3. Verification of technologies: establishing  
networks of testing centres, drafting catalogues 
of existing environmental technologies
4. Definition of performance targets based on 
best environmental performance
5. Mobilisation of financing: e.g. by introducing 
enhanced funding and risk-sharing mechanisms, 
such as CIP (see section 1.2.1), LIFE, or via the 
European Investment Bank or the Cohesion Policy 
6. Market-based Instruments: reviewing  
Cohesion Funds, state aid guidelines,  
environmentally harmful subsidies, and  
market-based instruments
7. Procurement of environmental technologies: 
e.g. using life-cycle costing or technology  
procurement; promotion via Commission’s 
handbook on Green Procurement or Member 
States’ action plans.
8. Business and consumer awareness-raising 
and targeted training, e.g. via the ETAP website 
and newsletters;
9. Acting Globally: promoting environmental 
technologies in developing countries and  
countries in economic transition via global  
financing opportunities and responsible  
investment and trade.
The dissemination of experiences is supported by 
national roadmaps and the stakeholder’s Forum 
on Eco-Innovation. However, the central role of 
dissemination seems to be underrated within the 
ETAP framework and should be further developed. 
Nevertheless, given the wide range of policy 
areas involved in the implementation of ETAP 
(research and technology development; public 
procurement; corporate social responsibility; 
development aid, etc.), it could be one of the key 
policy frameworks to realise a Green New Deal in 
Europe and beyond.

53A Green New Deal for Europe
5. Conclusions and recommendations
EU Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs 
(2009, 4) wrote in a working paper for the Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: “If we invest 
wisely in research and give European companies 
the right incentives to become world-leaders in 
renewable and other low-carbon energy techno-
logies, we can put the EU at the forefront of the 
third industrial revolution”. Indeed, a Green New 
Deal should lead towards a third industrial revo-
lution not only in the field of energy, but in all 
sectors relevant for natural resource use: we 
need a resource efficiency revolution. The fact 
that a Commissioner writes about a revolution 
indicates that this resource efficiency revolution 
will not sweep away the European Union as we 
know it, but rather that a pragmatic Green New 
Deal can build on what is already there using 
powerful driving forces within the system. 
Strategies
On a strategic level, there is still a lack of a guid-
ing vision for a systemic adaptation of production 
and consumption patterns. Sustainability objec-
tives still lack coherence across all EU activi-
ties, for example the vision proposed by Bringezu 
and Bleischwitz (2009). Nevertheless, the green 
parts of the Lisbon Strategy combined with 
the Sustainable Development Strategy contain 
elements which could be used as the central 
building blocks of such a vision. 
The reporting mechanisms of the Structural 
Indicators and the Sustainable Development 
Indicators should be improved and further 
developed, but they could be used immediately as 
a key component of a Green New Deal. In particular, 
they could monitor EU-wide improvements in 
resource productivity. 
Policies
Major EU policies could boost a Green New Deal 
by combining EU and national funding. With its 
Cohesion Policy, the EU has already a large 
funding system dedicated to structural change. 
According to the European Commission, a 
substantial amount will be spent on a sustainable 
regional policy: “Between 2007 and 2013, the total 
amount of Structural and Cohesion Funds allocated 
to environmental programs has doubled since the 
previous period to around €100 bn – 30% of the 
total. Half of this investment will be devoted to 
direct infrastructure investments related to water 
and waste treatment, renewal of contaminated 
sites, pollution reduction, and support for nature 
protection and risk prevention. The other half will 
go to indirect investments with an environmen-
tal impact on areas such as transport and energy 
systems, eco-innovation, environmental man-
agement for businesses, urban and rural regen-
eration, and eco-tourism. For example, over €7 
bn is earmarked to support energy efficiency and 
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renewable energies” (CEC 2008). Thus, EU 
regional policy is already operating in the same 
order of magnitude as the green stimulus of the 
European recovery programmes.
In the wake of the current economic crisis, fund-
ing rules changes have been adopted which aim at 
simplifying eligibility for EU co-financing, as well 
as increasing and accelerating payments. For 
example, these changes would allow pre-financing 
of EU funding through the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the European 
Social Fund in 2009 and 2010, plus an additional 
2% in the CEEC, equivalent to €4.6 bn. 
According to Friends of the Earth Europe,10 most 
of the new EU Member States have already 
planned or adopted national recovery packages 
which focus largely on speeding up EU funding for 
infrastructure. According to Friends of the Earth 
Europe and the CEE Bankwatch network, backing 
up national recovery plans with additional Com-
munity funds has both risks and opportunities. On 
the one hand, there is an immediate risk that this 
boosts conventional, unsustainable infrastructure 
planning, as illustrated by FoEE and CEE Bank-
watch (2009). This would have a long-term nega-
tive effect on, for example, transport and increase 
overall material and energy consumption in the 
affected regions. On the other hand, it is an oppor-
tunity for a Green New Deal. According to FoEE and 
CEE Bankwatch (2009), there is evidence of posi-
tive impacts: “In the Czech Republic, for instance, 
the Ministry of Environment is set to reallocate 
€470 mn towards EE/RES [energy efficiency/ 
renewable resources] this year. In Latvia, EU funds 
support will increase from €20 mn to €73 mn 
for the improvement of heat insulation in multi-
apartment residential buildings. Other countries 
make a step further by contemplating additional 
‘high-value’ stimulus measures – in Poland, the 
government has proposed €333 mn for wind tur-
bines and highly effective co-generation energy 
facilities. Slovakia will allocate more funds for EE/
RES from the Bohunice Nuclear Power Plant In-
ternational Decommissioning Support Fund and 
will develop soft measures such as a new pro-
gram in support of EE [energy efficiency]”.
It is obvious that for any Community funding, 
green conditionality is necessary. It is not justi-
fiable to EU taxpayers to spend 30% on sustainable 
development and risk that 70% supports develop-
ment which set the regions of Europe on a course 
in conflict with the objectives of the Sustainable 
Development Strategy. In particular, deregulated 
and intermediate support for national recovery 
plans needs to be connected to a Green New 
Deal. In the short term, additional support should 
only be granted if it can be linked to the green 
stimulus of national recovery programmes. Thus, 
the EU could create a fast-track “green light” 
mechanism: Community funding will be granted 
on a deregulated and fast-track basis if it is 
co-financed by a national green stimulus. To 
avoid questionable ‘green’ contributions, Member 
States and regions need to show that the national 
stimulus programme contributes to improving a 
country’s resource efficiency, already monitored 
via the Sustainable Development Indicators or 
the green Structural Indicators. The link between 
EU Cohesion Funding and national green stimulus 
programmes and the SDI would address two 
persistent problems of EU Regional Policy: a 
lack of co-funding and accountability. Using the 
established Cohesion Funds and reporting 
mechanisms would also allow the Community to 
implement a Green New Deal immediately. 
Programmes
Short-term Community support for a Green New 
Deal could be followed up by more consolidated 
medium-term action to integrate the necessary 
components of an appropriate policymix. This 
could be achieved mainly by improvements at 
the (inter) regional programming level. As dem-
onstrated in this chapter, the EU already has a 
number of sophisticated RTD programmes which 
are contributing to a greening of the EU economy. 
The different EU policies affecting a Green 
New Deal would have to converge and should be 
strengthened with Cohesion Funds. A concrete 
proposal for improving this kind of policy inte-
gration has been formulated by the Scientific and 
Technical Research Committee of the European 
Union (CREST). The Commission has published 
a report based on the CREST guidelines on using 
synergies between Structural Funds, the 
Research Framework Programme, and the 
Competitiveness and Innovation Programme 
(CIP).11 Further integration with the Environmental 
Technology Action Plan could be sought. Such an 
advanced scheme for using the EU budget could 
10   http://www.bankwatch.org/billions/projects-crisis.html
11   COM (2007) 474 final.
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be the foundation for developing a “triple-helix” 
consisting of stakeholders from enterprises, the 
public sector, research and teaching, who could 
drive and implement a lasting EU Green New Deal. 
As further explained in chapter 6, priority areas for 
advancing regional change could be sustainable 
mobility, and energy and material efficiency.
As demonstrated in chapter 3, the success of 
eco-industries depends on continuity and politi-
cal leadership. Instead of a revolution, a Green 
New Deal requires continuous effort by all stake-
holders to build a sustainable Europe. Much more 
than additional money, a Green New Deal needs 
political capital, which is much more difficult to 
muster: a political determination to halt unsus-
tainable spending practices and to implement 
and integrate in economic development strate-
gies measures to improve resource productivity 
as outlined, for example, in the EU Sustainable 
Development Strategy, the Environmental Action 
Programme and other relevant strategies. To 
improve resource productivity, the EU can build 
on its experience with a number of research and 
technological development programmes such as 
the Environmental Technology Action Plan and 
various successful regional development schemes.
As shown above, there are no principal arguments 
against a European efficiency revolution. The EU 
has already established Europe-wide consensus 
on elements within existing strategies, policies 
and programmes which could be used to start an 
efficiency revolution – immediately.
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6.  Analysing the main sectors and levers for a “Green Deal”  
in the EU-27 
6.1 Transport policy - problems and 
challenges in the European Union
Transport in the European Union contributes to sev-
eral major environmental problems, as is shown 
by the European Environment Agency (EEA) in the 
Transport and Environment Reporting Mechanism 
(TERM) report for 2008. The transport sector 
accounts for 19.1% of the European greenhouse 
gas emissions (EU 27, 2005; Eurostat 2009).
Road transport is an especially critical sector, as 
it accounts for more than 70% of CO2 emissions 
from transport (EU15, 2004; EEA 2007). Almost 
85% of the passenger kilometres in the EU-15 
are travelled by car, and more than 76% of freight 
(tonne-km) is transported by road (Eurostat 
2007). Road transport is still growing throughout 
the EU-27, and its greenhouse gas emissions are 













Figure 10 EU-15 modal split of inland earthbound 
passenger transport, 2004, % in passenger-km  
(Eurostat 2007, p. 79)
Figure 11 EU-27 modal split of inland earthbound freight 
transport, 2005, in tonne-km (Eurostat 2007, p. 78)
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Greenhouse gas emissions from transport
Social and environmental impacts of transport
Definition: This indicator shows trends in the emissions from transport (road, rail, inland 
navigation and domestic aviation) of the greenhouse gases regulated by the Kyoto Protocol.
Only three gases are relevant in the context of transport (carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous 
oxide) and these have been aggregated according to their relative global warming potentials.
The European Community is a signatory to both the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol thereto. The EU as a whole is therefore committed to a 
reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions of 8 %, compared with the base year, by 2008-2012.
An objective of the strategy is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from transport. Transport is 
of importance for several reasons. Firstly, it is a significant emitter of greenhouse gases, being 
responsible for a growing share (19.1 % in 2005, compared with 14.0 % in 1990) of total EU-27 
emissions. Secondly it is the only major source sector which is producing more greenhouse gas 
emissions than in 1990; every other sector has reduced its emissions (see greenhouse gas emis-
sions by sector). Transport is therefore a critical sector in achieving the Kyoto target.
A major part of greenhouse gas emissions from transport is carbon dioxide emissions, which 
are influenced by a number of factors, including the modal split of transport, but also use of 
lower-carbon fuels, engine efficiency, friction, driver behaviour, and traffic flows.
Indicator 
relevance
Growth in greenhouse gas emissions from transport has slowed down below the growth rate 
of energy consumption (see headline indicator). During the 1990s the average growth rate 
for the EU-15 stood at about 1.8 % per year, compared with the somewhat slower growth 
in the EU-27 at 1.6 % per year. Since 2000, growth in the EU-15 (at about 0.9 % per year on 
average) has fallen below that of growth in the EU-27 (1.2 %). Although it is too soon to 
draw any conclusions about the long-term trend, 2005 was a remarkable year in that growth 
in the EU-15 actually fell by 0.4 % relative to the previous year, and EU-27 emissions only 
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Figure 12 Greenhouse gas emissions from transport, million tonnes of CO2 equivalent (Eurostat 2007, p. 83)
In addition to CO2 emissions, road transport also 
causes other environmental and health problems 
such as air p llution, noise, land use a d land-
scape fragmentation, impacts on habitats and 
biodiversity, and serious accidents.
Noise from road and rail transport is a severe 
problem, especially in densely populated areas. 
More than 210 million EU citizens are exposed to 
levels of road noise that put their health at risk or 
cause annoyance, stress and sleep disturbance 
(CE Delft 2007).
Air pollution by particulate matter, nitrogen 
oxides, sulphur dioxide and ozone caused by road 
transport seriously damages human health and 
the environment (CEC 2005b).
These problems are set to increase significantly 
unless there is a strategic shift in transport policies 
worldwide, as transport in newly industrialised 
countries like China or India is growing fast. It 
will not be possible to meet climate targets and 
the objectives of cutting pollution, noise and 
accidents without a fundamental transformation 
of the transport sector.
Improving the sustainability of transport is not 
only a key challenge in fighting climate change 
and other environmental problems, but, as an 
important sector in modern economies, more 
efficient and sustainable transport systems con-
tribute to economic growth. Thus, integration of 
sustainable transport investments in European 
recovery plans can provide important stimuli for 
economic development and employment.
Urban mobility is crucial to achieve sustainable 
transport. Over 60% of the EU population lives 
in urba  areas of over 10,000 inhabitants. U ban 
traffic is responsible f r 40% of the CO2 emissions 
from road transport and 70% of emissions from 
other road transport pollutants (CEC 2007a). 
Besides environmental problems, social aspects 
also need to be addressed: sustainable transport 
faces individual mobility problems caused by dis-
ability, age or other reasons. The special require-
ments of low-income households also have to be 
considered. 
Regarding political strategies and social and eco-
nomic conditions, freight and passenger transport 
are quite different, as are “earthbou d” transport 
modes and air and sea travel. Thus, this section 
exclusively concentrates on describing problems 
and solutions in the field of earthbound passen-
ger transport.
6.1.1 Strategies for sustainable passenger 
transport
There are no simple solutions to achieve sustain-
able transport that meets environmental, social 
and economic requirements. Until now, the impact 
of fuel-efficiency improvements have been offset by 
several rebound effects: an increase in the number 
and weight of cars, the upsizing of engines and the 
kilometres travelled. Hence, an integrated approach 
in the field of transport policy is more promising.
A sustainable policy for passenger transport 
should focus on three basic strategies: reducing 
transport needs, a shift to more sustainable 
transport modes, and the promotion of efficient 
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vehicles and traffic flow (WI 2008). With respect 
to the sustainability of measures, a hierarchy of 
these three strategies can be introduced. 
Reducing the need for transport altogether is a top 
priority, which involves maintaining mobility while 
reducing the kilometres travelled. This notion of 
mobility is defined by the capacity to carry out dif-
ferent human activities such as business, work, 
purchase, leisure and other social and cultural 
activities (Petersen 2004). It requires an integrated 
policy of transport and spatial development. Dense 
structures of housing, working and shopping facili-
ties and places for leisure allow people to carry out 
their activities without travelling long distances. 
However, measures in spatial and infrastructural 
development require long-term development – it 
can take decades before significant results are 
felt. Thus they are not the focus of this study, 
which is primarily looking at the short-term 
effects of recovery packages.
A second strategic aspect of sustainable mobility 
relates to the way in which remaining transport 
needs are satisfied. The different modes of earth-
bound transport – walking, cycling, buses, trains 
and cars – have different environmental advan-
tages and disadvantages. 
The non-motorised modes have the least impact 
on the environment, followed by bus and train; 
cars have the greatest impact. Therefore it is rea-
sonable to support zero-emission mobility over 
short distances, and train and public transport by 
bus or tram for medium-range or longer distances. 
This includes the provision of infrastructure and 
its interconnection to promote intermodality, the 
purchase of vehicles, mobility management, and 
information, education and service measures. 
While infrastructure investments usually take a 
long time, the other measures can be integrated 
in a Green New Deal programme. They act as pull-
factors for a modal shift. Push factors should also 
be introduced: speed limits, low-emission-zones 
or congestion charges, eco-taxes on fuel and 
higher motor vehicle taxes for gas guzzlers are 
examples of measures that help level the uneven 
conditions for more sustainable modes of transport.
The third strategic pillar is the improvement of 
transport efficiency. This includes measures 
related to vehicle technology as well as intelligent 
traffic management systems and eco-driving. 
Policy instruments in this field are emission 
limits, fiscal measures to integrate external costs 
of transport, and R&D programmes; the latter 
two are possible parts of a Green New Deal.
In summary, the following possible elements of a 
Green New Deal can be identified:
•  investments in new transport vehicles –  
buses, trams and regional trains; 
•  investments in short-term infrastructure  
for bicycle and pedestrians;
•  investments in infrastructure improvements 
for public transport;
•  investments in services to improve the  
user-friendliness of public transport;
•  incentives for retro-fitting cars and public 
transport vehicles; 
• fiscal measures to subsidise low-carbon vehicles;
• research into energy efficiency technology;
•  marketing of more sustainable modes  
of transport; 
• education on eco-driving.
In addition to the environmental targets of 
sustainable transport, the social dimension (the 
mobility needs of people without cars) and 
economic dimensions (e.g. cost/benefit analysis 
of modal split change and higher transportation 
costs caused by internalising external effects) of 
sustainable mobility should be recognised.
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6.1.2 Existing recovery programmes in the  
European Union – instruments in the passenger 
transport sector
The existing recovery programmes of EU and 
member states already contain several mea-
sures concerning passenger transport.
The European Economic Recovery Plan, proposed 
by the Commission, contains a “European green 
cars initiative” to promote the use of renewable 
and non-polluting energy sources. The proposed 
contributions of the Member States and the EIB 
to research account for €5 bn. (HSBC 2009) 
Important recovery programmes of the Member 
States contain various expenditures related to 
transport, for example: (HSBC 2009)
•  several Member States are investing in road 
and railway infrastructure (Germany, France); 
•  Germany is investing €2 bn in public transport 
systems in 2009 and 2010, France is investing 
€950 mn in new high-speed railway lines. For rail 
transport, the stimulus programmes of Germany, 
France, Italy and the UK together contain €5.8 bn 
of expenditure. This is a relatively small amount 
compared to the spending on the car industry.
•  France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain 
and Sweden have launched programmes 
supporting their car manufacturers, mostly with 
credits (e.g. France with €6 bn for Renault and 
Peugeot-Citroen). Credits for the car industry 
are also provided by the European Investment 
Bank – amounting to €9 bn in 2009.
•  Germany has launched a programme for the 
development of electric mobility worth €500 mn, 
for example for battery development, grid adaptation 
and integrated concepts in model regions in the 
years 2009 to 2011 (BMWi et al. 2009).
•  Following the lead set by France and Germany, 
Austria, Cyprus, the Netherlands, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Spain and the UK launched incentive schemes 
for scrapping old and purchasing new 
cars (ACEA 2009). The effects of different 
programme designs are described in the box.
Figure 13 New Passenger Car Registrations in Europe 2008-2009 (ACEA 2009b)
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Scrapping Bonus as an example for different 
instrument designs
In April 2009, the European Automobile Manu-
facturers Association ACEA reported a decline 
in new passenger car registrations for the 11th 
consecutive month, with a fall of 9% in March 
compared to the same month last year – following 
the sharpest falls in January, down 27% (ACEA 
2009b).
The German and the French markets helped 
to weaken the downward trend. In both coun-
tries, governments introduced large-scale 
incentive schemes for buying new cars, followed 
by 10 other EU member states. Together, those 
schemes led to a recovery in European car 
markets (ACEA 2009c).
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In France, the scheme started in December 
2008. It subsidized the purchase of a new car if a 
vehicle which is at least 10 years old is scrapped. 
The subsidy, which was later raised from €300 
to €1000 now, is only paid for new cars that emit 
less than 160 g CO2/km. In total, €500 mn will be 
allocated to “scrappage” and the “bonus malus” 
scheme in 2009 (HSBC 2009).
The less-than-160g emissions requirement 
sets the French scheme apart from the German 
“environmental bonus” (Umweltprämie) intro-
duced in January 2009. In Germany, €2500 is 
paid for a newly licensed car and the scrapping of 
a car which is at least nine years old. The scheme 
accounts for €3 bn. The only environmental 
requirement is that the new car complies with 
the Euro 4 emission standard, which has applied 
to new car models since 2005. 
Whereas the French scheme promotes the pur-
chase of cars emitting less than the current 
average of the European car fleet, the German 
model does not affect the CO2 emissions of the 
new cars. The scheme therefore allows for an 
old but energy-efficient car to be scrapped while 
potentially subsidising a new SUV. So far the 
government has received 1.3 million requests 
for the bonus. In the first four months of 2009, 
car sales increased by about 20% in Germany 
(VDA 2009) and the downward trend in France 
may have stabilised (ACEA 2009b). 
An analysis of the German scrappage bonus 
shows a trend towards smaller and less-emitting 
cars: average CO2 emissions from newly regis-
tered cars in April 2009 were155 g/km - 10 g/km 
below the same month in 2008 (IG Metall 2009). 
The trend towards lower emissions can be 
explained by the group addressed by the bonus: 
low-income earners generally own cars that are 
at least 9 years old, and they do not usually buy 
new vehicles; encouraged by the bonus, they tend 
to buy smaller and thus lower-emitting new cars.
Nevertheless, it is doubtful if this relatively small 
decrease in the CO2 emissions of new cars con-
tributes to lower CO1 pt emissions overall. A 
considerable share of the emissions emerges 
during the production of a car. Different production 
techniques and measurement problems make it 
difficult to calculate specific data, but the num-
bers resulting from exemplary studies range 
between 7 and 15% of the CO2 emissions (Kim et. 
al. 2004; Automotiveworld 2009). The earlier a car 
is taken off the streets, the higher the percentage 
of lifecycle energy necessary for its production. 
Thus the positive effect of a slightly less-emitting 
fleet is offset by the energy used in the production 
process due to advanced scrappage. 
Beyond this, there are other critical aspects to 
the sustainability of scrappage schemes. The 
relatively high and short-term subsidies are 
incentives to buy a car and not think about choos-
ing other modes of transport like public transport 
or using car-sharing.12 The long-term economic 
effectiveness of the schemes can also be ques-
tioned, because many of the cars would have 
been bought later anyway (HWWI 2009).
It would be environmentally more effective to 
introduce more targetoriented instruments, like 
a bonus for especially fuel-saving cars. Oriented 
towards the CO2 emissions of new cars, a bonus 
would be awarded for cars below 140g CO2/km, 
the value of which would increase with decreasing 
emissions. This kind of bonus system has the effect 
of reducing fleet emissions significantly while 
simultaeneously promoting efficient technology. 
12   The term car-sharing is used in the sense of an organised short-term car-rental, in contrast to private car sharing.
6.1.3 Profiles of key instruments in the earth-
bound passenger transport sector
The EU transport sector is of considerable eco-
nomic importance: about 5.7% (2005) of the 
population in the EU-27 work in the transport 
services sector, of whom about 900,000 (2006) 
are employed in the railway sector (CEC 2009d). 
A further 1.5% work in vehicle manufacturing. 
The International Association of Public Trans-
port estimates that about 1 million people in the 
EU are directly employed in the public transport 
sector, and for every direct job, 2 to 2.5 indirect 
jobs typically exist. Turnover is about €125 bn per 
year (UITP 2009a). Without an in-depth analysis 
of employment structures, it is difficult to clearly 
distinguish between the public transport and 
car traffic sectors: the automotive industry con-
structs both cars and buses, and supply firms 
work for both sectors.
Altogether, the transport sector accounts for 
some 8.9% of the EU’s GDP. 13.5% of private 
household spending is on transport. About one-third 
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of this sum (around €310 bn) is used for the 
purchase of vehicles, almost half (€470 bn) for 
operating personal transport equipment (e.g. fuel 
for cars) and the remainder (€169 bn) is spent on 
transport services like bus, train or plane tickets 
(EU27, 2005; CEC 2009b). 
The following chapters focus on four fields of 
action: support for public buses, support for 
regional trains and urban trams, the promotion of 
walking and cycling, and support for fuel-efficient 
cars. The different measures in these fields fall 
in three categories of instruments: a) direct 
investments; b) support for technology to 
increase competitiveness; and c) soft measures, 
such as education and marketing, that help 
reduce emissions but have no investment effects.
These measures implement modal shift strate-
gies with both push and pull factors, as well as 
strategies for a higher energy efficiency of the 
existing modes.
Support for public buses – fleet renewal and 
extension, bus technology research, 
eco-driving, marketing
Public transport by bus has great advantag-
es over private car transport with respect to 
energy use and greenhouse gas emissions – per 
passenger-kilometre, urban bus transport causes 
only about half of the CO2 emissions of a car (UBA 
2007). Public buses contribute to an attractive 
and inexpensive urban transport system. Extend-
ing and greening the fleet and marketing and 
education measures are also suggested by the 
European Commission’s Green Paper on Urban 
Transport. The following measures to strengthen 
public buses should be supported:
•  fleet extension: rising passenger numbers show 
the growing acceptance of public bus transport 
throughout Europe. More capacity allows 
increased frequency of service and strengthens 
the bus network. This raises the quality and 
capacity of the public transport and creates 
incentives for a modal shift from car to bus;
•  fleet renewal: quick procurement of energy- 
efficient and low-emitting buses can help to 
achieve two goals – not only avoiding green-
house gases, but also other pollutants such as 
diesel soot and NOx-emissions – in line with 
the Directive on air quality (1999/30/EC). Today, 
fewer than 5% of the buses in the EU-27 comply 
with Euro 4 or higher (UITP 2009b). There is 
particularly significant potential for fleet renewal 
in the new member states with large shares of 
Euro 1, 2 or Pre-Euro vehicles. Buses with particle 
filters that meet the EEV-requirements are already 
available; hybrid buses, which are especially 
efficient in urban traffic, will probably be launched 
onto the market in 2010. The CO2 emissions of 
hybrid buses are up to 30% lower than those of 
conventional buses (Mercedes-Benz 2008);
•  research: a research focus on bus efficiency 
technology can develop technological potential 
like lightweight design, hydrogen technology 
and electric engines;
•  education in eco-driving: driving in an energy-
efficient way can save 5 to 10% of fuel in urban 
traffic. Eco-driving courses for bus drivers 
should be supported;
•  public transport marketing: together with  
improvements in the public transport system, 
soft policies like social marketing can create 
pull factors towards public transport. The  
focus should be on cities and agglomerations.
These measures can have an impact on employ-
ment in several sectors: the automotive and 
supply industry, transport planning and consulting, 
driving training, marketing and advertising. 
The size of the job-creation potential is difficult 
to estimate as it depends on various assump-
tions. Rough estimates made in a recent short-
term study by HSBC give a first impression of the 
potential: South Korea’s government estimates it 
will create about 138,000 jobs with about €9 bn 
of spending in the public transport and railroad 
sector – which caters for a population of 49 million 
people (HSBC 2009).
Support of regional rail and urban trams – fleet 
renewal and extension 
The role of regional sustainable rail transport 
compares with the role of urban buses described 
in the chapter above. Regional and suburban rail 
trips account for 90% of the total number of rail 
passengers and half of the passenger kilometres. 
Urban tram systems are being reintroduced and 
expanded at the moment – as in Strasbourg, 
where the tram, introduced in 1994, could double 
the modal split of public transport within 10 years 
(UITP 2009c).
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CO2 emissions from regional rail transport per 
passenger-kilometre are approximately 30% 
below the emissions from cars, and emissions from 
tram or metro systems are as much as 50% lower 
(UBA 2007). Rail and tram transport contributes to 
an attractive urban and regional transport system. 
The following measures should be supported to 
strengthen regional rail and urban tram transport:
•  fleet extension: although the modal split of 
railway transport remains low, at 6.1% of the 
passenger-kilometres travelled in the EU, 
absolute numbers are rising. At the same 
time, the stock of rail vehicles and coaches is 
decreasing (Commission 2009d). The extension 
of urban tram systems often fails to occur 
because of tight municipal budgets;
•  fleet renewal: infrastructure for regional rail 
transport in many EU member counties is close 
to capacity limits. Besides an extension of the 
rail network, modernisation of the rail vehicle 
and coach fleet can expand capacities, by for  
example buying double-deck coaches and energy-
efficient locomotives. Renewing the tram fleet, 
introducing energy-efficient low-floor trams, can 
increase the attractiveness of public transport 
and help establish barrier-free urban transport.
Employment effects can be expected in the rail-
way and supply industry as well as in railway and 
urban transport service staff. 
Noise Reduction: Measures for vehicles 
and infrastructure
Reducing traffic noise does not only have posi-
tive effects on well-being and health, but also 
has a substantial economic impact: the Com-
mission estimates the total cost of noise at 0.2 
to 2% of the Union’s GDP (CEC 1996). Measures 
tackling the source of the noise – the vehicles and 
the transport infrastructure – are more effective 
than reducing noise emissions by, for example, 
installing noise barriers and insulated windows 
(KPMG 2005). As a part of a Green New Deal, the 
following measures should be supported:
•  incentives for the purchase of low-noise tyres 
for cars and buses: the traffic noise reduction 
potential of tyres produced with the technology 
available today is 2-4 dB, which means halving 
the volume. Grants for buying them can accelerate 
market penetration. This measure should be 
supported by strengthening EU tyre standards to 
address noise reduction and fuel consumption as 
well as emissions and noise labelling;
•  fleet renewal and the extension of regional rail and 
urban trams (see 0) should include requirements 
for state-of-the-art noise reduction technologies 
such as low-noise engines and brakes;
•  railway infrastructure should be improved for  
the purpose of noise reduction by periodical 
monitoring and the grinding of rails; road should 
be renewed with open-pore asphalt. 
Emission Reduction: Retro-fitting cars and buses
According to EU regulations (2008/50/EC) and the 
Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution (CEC 2005b), 
pollutants like ozone, sulphur dioxide, nitrogen 
oxides and particulate matter have to decrease 
significantly. On the municipal level, clean air 
plans, including for example environmental 
zones, are an instrument to meet the emissions 
objectives. They should be supported by in-
centives for retro-fitting private and public road 
vehicles with particulate filters, as illustrated by 
the following good practice examples: 
•  cars: a retro-fitting bonus of €330 for car  
owners was successfully implemented in  
Germany in 2007 (BMU 2009a). More than 
350,000 cars have been equipped so far;
•  buses: a programme for retro-fitting public 
buses with particulate filters is in force in  
California – the Lower-Emission School Bus 
Retrofit Programme (ARB 2009) – using American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act funding. In 
France, a €1300 subsidy is given for retro- 
fitting particulate filters on buses (ADEME 2009);
•  commercial vehicles: the Netherlands, the Lom-
bardy region in Italy, Flanders in Belgium and 
Scotland in the UK pay bonuses for retro-fitting 
commercial vehicles. (dieselretrofit.eu 2009).
© iStockphoto.com
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Promotion of walking and cycling – infrastructure 
and campaigning
“Zero-emission mobility” (walking and cycling) 
is sustainable in multiple ways: it emits neither 
greenhouse gases nor other pollutants or noise, 
and it is good for individual well-being and public 
health. To promote these modes of transports, 
better local infrastructure and information and 
image campaigning can help. The Green Paper 
on Urban Transport highlights the importance of 
education, training and awareness-raising to create 
a new urban mobility cultures (CEC 2007a). The 
proposed measures are:
•  infrastructure extension: in contrast to road 
and rail infrastructure, the setting-up or  
upgrading of a dense urban cycle route  
network can be implemented quite quickly; 
•  image and information campaigns: campaigns 
to promote a modal shift from short-distance 
car transport to walking and cycling can be  
carried out by the EU or the member states. 
The implementation of such campaigns should 
integrate urban politics, civil society and local 
business. 
These measures have positive employment 
effects in several sectors: transport planning and 
consulting, road construction, the advertising 
business, and the bicycle (equipment) industry.
Supporting people with mobility problems
Helping to find solutions for all kind of mobility 
problems is a concern of EU policy, although 
regulations have so far only been introduced on the 
rights of flight passengers with reduced mobility 
(Regulation (EC) No 1107/2006). Particularly in 
light of demographic change, it is important to 
improve the accessibility of – and the quality of 
service on – public transport. 
However, there are also social reasons for limited 
mobility. In 2007, 78 million people in the EU (16% of 
the population) were at risk of poverty (CEC 2007b). 
People living in low-income households often have 
problems paying the costs of mobility. As a result of 
higher unemployment due to the economic crisis, 
poverty rates are expected to rise.
The following measures should be supported to 
help people solve their mobility problems: 
•  improvements in infrastructure, vehicles and 
services: bus, tram and railway stations should 
be modified to better fit the needs of people 
with limited mobility, with ramps and lifts, 
blind stones or talking sign systems;
•  supporting low-income households: public 
transport tickets at reduced prices should be 
provided, particularly for people in low-income 
households. This kind of voucher stimulates 
demand, as low-income households tend to 
spend rather than save their money.
Support for fuel-efficient cars according to EU 
CO2-emission standards
The current crisis in the US car manufacturing 
industry underlines what climate change and 
spikes in oil prices have already shown: vehicles 
with high fuel consumption have no future; the 
automotive industry has to shift its strategic direction 
towards smaller, more energy-efficient cars, 
especially in new markets in the newly industrialised 
countries. Downsizing is required to make the cars 
smaller, lighter, slower and less powerful.
Under EU legislation on vehicle emission limits, 
car manufacturers will have to switch production 
to smaller and more energy-efficient cars. Incen-
tives for consumers can also help to accomplish 
this “model switch”. 
A reform of the motor vehicle tax in relation to 
CO2 emissions is an important incentive. The 
tax should take CO2 emissions as a basis and 
rise progressively to encourage the purchase of 
energy-efficient cars. It should be aligned to the 
EU emission standards, taking the current and 
the future emission limits as cornerstones for 
a tax bonus. The progressive nature of the tax 
would ensure a big tax difference between an 
average-emitting car and one that complies with 
the fleet emission standards. Dynamic design can 
prevent a loss of effectiveness – and the tax curve 
can be shifted annually according to changes in 
emission limits.
The Green New Deal should include a bonus system 
for truly low-emitting cars, exempting those below 
95 g CO2/km from the tax completely and reducing 
it for those in the emissions range of 95 - 130 g.
A new motor vehicle tax can act as a truly environ-
mentally friendly scrappage bonus, as it only sets 
incentives for the purchase of low-emission vehicles. 
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It can stabilise employment in the automotive In-
dustry in a more sustainable way than undifferenti-
ated scrappage schemes, as it will make European 
car manufacturers fit for the future.
6.2 Energy Policy: Problems and 
Challenges in the European Union13
The energy sector plays a crucial role in EU 
climate policy since it accounts for about 60% of 
all GHG emissions in the EU-15 (Eurostat 2008). 
Besides the environmental impact of energy pro-
duction and consumption, the energy system is 
highly relevant for employment and economic 
development, and for vulnerability to external 
price shocks or problems of security of supply. 
Consequently, the EU’s energy and climate 
package already has a special focus on further 
improvements in the energy system and on fos-
tering energy efficiency in all end-use sectors. 
This also holds true for decreasing dependency 
on fossil fuels imports. With rising global energy 
prices, the increasing costs of energy imports put 
pressure on the competiveness of the EU.
Energy-related indicators at the EU level show, 
however, that there is a need to develop and 
implement additional measures and supporting 
schemes to reduce energy consumption and GHG 
emissions. Since 1995, for example, final energy 
consumption in the EU has increased slightly in 
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Figure 14 Final Energy Consumption in the EU (EU-27 and Euro Area; Eurostat 2008)
Despite this, most Member States in the EU-27 
have been able to reduce GHG emissions com-
pared to 1990 – though not dramatically (IEA 
2020). The trend is only upwards in Slovenia, 
Portugal, Austria, Malta, Luxemburg, Lithuania, 
Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Greece and Ireland (figure 
15). From a sectoral perspective, energy (59%) 
and transport (21%) are the largest emitting 
sectors. Other sectors (agriculture, industrial 
processes, waste) are responsible for the 
remainder of EU-27 GHG emissions (figure 16). 
It is obvious that further efforts and initiatives, 
especially in the energy sector, are required to 
reach the ambitious emissions reduction targets 
set by the EU for the year 2020.
13  With contributions by Christof Arens and Vera Hoefele.
66































Figure 15 Greenhouse gas emissions by Member State (1995 and 2005 compared to 1990, based on data in million 
tonnes CO2 equivalent; Eurostat 2008)
Figure 16 Greenhouse gas emissions by sector 
(EU-15, 2005 in percent, based on data in  
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6.2.1 Existing regulations and strategies
On 23 January 2008, the EU presented its gen-
eral design for an improved climate policy pack-
age to put the Union on track to further reduce 
energy consumption and greenhouse gas emis-
sions in the years to 2020. Most of the elements 
have now been adopted by the European Parliament 
and Council. The European Commission itself 
has presented the 20/20/20 climate package as 
a strategic triangle balanced between sustain-
able development targets, improving Europe’s 
economic competitiveness in the global context, 
and addressing security of energy supply issues 
(Koskimäki 2008), as shown in figure 17.
The EU’s climate package consists of a broad 
spectrum of directives and regulations, including: 
• the Effort Sharing Decision (2009/406 EC);
•  the Directive on energy performance of  
buildings (2002/91/EC);
• the Ecodesign Directive (2005/32/EC);
•  the Directive on energy end-use efficiency and 
energy services (2006/32/EC);
•  the Directive on the promotion of co-generation 
(2004/8/EC);
• the Renewables Directive (2001/77 EC);
•  the Emissions Trading Directive (2008/101/EC, 
2004/101/EC, 2003/87/EC);
• the Car Directive. 
Simultaneously, energy-related European projects 
and programmes have been funded within the 
Intelligent Energy-Europe programme (IEE) and in 
the context of regional development programmes 
(EFRE, URBAN, Cohesion Funds). 
In financial terms, according to Edenhofer and 
Stern (2009), the EU has provided US$0.6 bn 
(€0.42 bn) to foster the use of renewable energies 
and US$2.8 bn (€1.97 bn) to support green 
investments in the building sector between 2009 
and 2010. 
These regulations and programmes have all 
been created to complement related activities 
and measures at Member State and regional 
levels. As an example, France provides US$0.9 
bn (€0.63 bn) in fiscal measures to foster 
renewable energies between 2009 and 2010 and 
US$0.8 bn (€0.56 bn) to support refurbishments 
in buildings. These amounts of fiscal resources in 
the building sector are exceeded by the building 
programmes in Germany, for which US$10.4 bn 
(€7.32 bn) is being provided (ibid.). 
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6.2.2 Potential and abatement costs
In 2008, the Wuppertal Institute published an 
update of an integrated scenario analysis on behalf 
of the WWF: “How to achieve a domestic 30% 
GHG emission reduction target in the EU by 2020” 
(Lechtenböhmer 2008, based on Lechtenböhmer 
et. al. 2008). Its objective was to assess the 
effects of EU initiatives and Directives on the 
EU’s climate package by the year 2020. The 
study demonstrated the potential to reduce GHG 
emissions until 2020 by about 30% compared 
with 1990 levels. However, due to a lack of active 
policies, especially in Member States, in recent 
years, the figure has declined compared to a 
similar study conducted in 2005. 
As its 2005 predecessor did, the update stressed 
the major role of energy efficiency as a main con-
tributor to greenhouse gas mitigation and energy 
savings in all sectors and Member States. In 
the so-called “Policies and Measures Scenario” 
(P&M), the final energy demand scenario 
decreases by 6.5% from 2005 to 2020 and almost 
20% compared with the “Business-as-usual 
Scenario” (BAU). Accounting for nearly half of the 
overall savings, its impact is particularly strong 
on the residential sector. Final energy demand in 
this sector is reduced by about 11.6%. In terms 
of fuel demand, there is a sharp drop in solid fuels, 
decreasing by about 59%, and oil, decreasing by 
about 20%. In contrast, the demand for district 
heat (48%) and the direct use of renewable energies 
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Figure 18 Overview of GHG emission reductions in the 30%-P&M scenario vs. BAU (WI 2008)
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Savings vs. BAU (2020) Share of  
savings 
Savings vs. 2005 Share of  
savings ktoe % ktoe %
Final Energy Demand by sector 260,387 19.3% 100.0% 75,069 6.5% 100.0%
Industry 69,838 19.0% 26.8% 21,936 6.9% 29.2%
Residential 64,482 19.2% 24.8% 35,709 11.6% 47.6%
Tertiary 40,619 19.8% 15.6% 8,913 5.1% 11.9%
Transport 85,448 19.5% 32.8% 8,511 2.4% 11.3%
by fuel (negative savings increase demand)
Solids 30,974 60.9% 11.9% 28,604 5.9% 38.1%
Oil 150,304 27.9% 57.7% 95,398 19.7% 127.1%
Gas 84,394 29.1% 32.4% 65,181 24.1% 86.8%
Electricity 47,496 15.7% 18.2% -13,098 -5.4% -17.4%
Heat (from CHP and District Heating) -6,952 -8.2% -2.7% -29,535 -47.6% -39.3%
Other (mainly renewables) -45,829 -58.0% -17.6% -71,490 -134.0% -95.2%
Table 9 Final energy savings 30%-P&M scenario vs. BAU (WI 2008)
6.2.3 Strategic fields of action and employment 
effects
As a premise, the implementation of a green 
investment programme at the EU level will increase 
its long-term impact on emission reductions and 
employment if it is part of a coherent policy pack-
age at the EU, Member State and regional level. 
Policy research, for example, has shown that a 
coherent strategy for the building sector should 
include co-ordinated policy instruments at the 
European level targeted at both end-users and 
multipliers. In complete policy packages for end-
users, the provision of financial incentives such 
as soft loan schemes or direct financial subsi-
dies represent only one element, complemented 
by related information measures (public infor-
mation campaigns), advice and consultancy, 
institutional measures (e.g. energy agencies) and 
regulatory approaches. In addition to measures 
targeted at improving energy efficiency among 
end-users, a coherent strategy will also address 
relevant multipliers, market agents and pro- 
ducers through educational initiatives, measures 
to ensure quality control, market-based instru-
ments and services, networking activities and 
voluntary agreements with (sub-) sectors (Schüle 
et al. 2009). 
There is as yet no comprehensive data available 
on the impact of green investment programmes 
on employment. In 2005, the renewable energy 
sector employed about 1.4 million people with a 
gross value added of €58 bn in the EU, although 
the significance of the sector varies strongly 
between Member States. Biomass, wind and hydro 
technologies are currently the most important for 
employment. In the future, significantly more people 
are expected to be employed in the renewable 
energy sector, especially in the Member States 
that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. A European 
study (ISI-Fraunhofer et al. 2009) concluded that 
the development of renewable energy will create 
about 900,000 new jobs by 2020, of which some 
400,000 will be created in the renewable energy 
sector and about 500,000 in agriculture and 
forestry areas that supply primary fuels.
Improved energy efficiency in general will be able 
to contribute at least the same amount. FIEC 
(quoting from Ernst & Young 2006) estimates that 
about 26 million workers in the EU depend on the 
building construction sector, directly or indirectly. 
Between 14 million employees in the EU-15 and 
12 million people working in the EU-25 (Ernst 
& Young 2006) are estimated to be employed in 
the eco-construction sector. For Germany alone, 
a recent study (ifeu et al. 2009) calculated a net 
increase in employment of 260,000 by 2020 from 
energy efficiency measures in the energy and 
transport sectors. 
In developing an investment programmes at the EU 
level, four main strategic fields can be identified: 
1. Improving the energy performance of buildings 
(residential, tertiary, and industry buildings; 
existing buildings; new buildings; heating and 
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cooling systems, including the use of renewable 
energies; smart metering).
2. Reducing the energy use of electrical 
appliances.
3. Reducing energy use and emissions in 
industrial processes.
4. Making European electricity grids more flexible. 
(1) Strategic Field 1: Improving energy 
performance of buildings 
In order to increase the rate and quality of refur-
bishments in existing buildings as well as the 
energy performance of new buildings, the provision 
of information and low-interest loan schemes com-
bined with advisory schemes has been the pre-
dominant (and most effective) approach chosen in 
Member States (Schüle et al. 2009), although con-
sumer surveys indicate that direct subsidies could 
be more effective than soft loans. One example of 
a low-interest loan scheme is the German CO2 
Building Retrofit Programme of the German 
Federal Reconstruction Loan Corporation (Kredi-
tanstalt für Wiederaufbau), which focuses on both 
improving the energy performance of buildings 
themselves and improving building installations, 
including the use of renewable energies and CHP 
supply systems. Some Member States also offer 
incentive programmes complementary to loan 
schemes, such as household tax deductions or 
direct subsidies for buildings with a high level 
of energy performance. Direct subsidies for very 
energy-efficient buildings or retro-fits have 
recently also been added, for example to the 
German programmes. Despite marked successes, 
however, there is still the challenge of significantly 
increasing retro-fitting rates and the energy per-
formance of existing buildings through additional 
investment programmes at EU level. 
Accelerating retro-fitting rates and improving 
the energy performance of existing buildings 
For existing buildings (residential, public, com-
mercial, industrial), Member States should be 
required to achieve the renovation of at least 3% of 
the building stock each year to comply with low-
energy standards. The instruments used should 
be a matter for the Member States. Additional 
funding in the framework of a green investment 
programme should include the following 
elements: 
1. In order to accelerate retro-fitting rates and 
simultaneously achieve higher standards in retro- 
fitting, we recommend launching schemes which offer 
homeowners and SMEs advisory service vouchers. 
Independent advisory services play a crucial role in 
raising awareness in the residential and business 
sector. Such services are usually comprised of a tech-
nical diagnosis of the current energetic performance 
of the building, recommendations on energy-saving 
measures and information on funding opportunities. 
Related research showed that advisory services can 
contribute significantly to both the implementation 
of additional energy-saving measures when prop-
erty owners are planning refurbishments and to the 
implementation of measures to achieve a higher 
energy performance. To avoid simply implementing 
an isolated additional advisory scheme, the provision 
of advisory service vouchers should be closely linked 
to existing labelling schemes (energy certificates) 
and existing (initial and in depth) advisory schemes 
at Member State level. 
A special focus should be placed on: 
•  multi-family houses (especially those made of 
precast concrete slabs in CEEC Member States);
• one-family houses ;
•  public buildings (administration and school 
buildings);
• service-sector and industry buildings.
2. As well as advisory service vouchers, additional 
grants should be offered directly to support the 
use of renewable energies and achieve high 
energy-efficiency standards in the refurbishment 
of existing buildings.
3. As regards increasing energy performance 
standards in existing buildings, the R&D challenge 
now is to implement passive house or zero-emis-
sion house standards. Intelligent combinations of 
high energy performance standards for the building 
itself and the use of renewable energies are required 
to significantly reduce energy consumption and 
emissions from this sector. In the short term, thus, 
an investment programme at EU level can address 
this challenge by funding pilot projects in which 
existing buildings move towards passive house or 
zero emissions house standards in the residential, 
public, service and industry sectors. Apart from the 
financial dimension, the implementation of high 
energy performance standards in existing build-
ings requires complementary control schemes and 
training measures for planners, architects, crafts-
men and producers of construction materials. 
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4. In order to extend the focus from an isolated 
building perspective to urban zones and environ-
ments, additional green investment programmes 
should support cities and regions to develop con-
cepts and pilot projects of zero-emission zones 
or zero-emission cities. A study by the Wuppertal 
Institute (2009) demonstrates, using the example of 
a growing urban quarter in the city of Munich, that 
an integrated combination of ambitious efficiency 
measures in existing buildings, high energy 
performance standards for new buildings (plus- 
energy houses) and an extensive use of renewable 
energies (in the case of Munich, especially solar 
and geothermal energy) can reduce emissions 
radically in the long term. This example shows 
that existing district heating systems can be inte-
grated in such an urban or zone-based strategy. 
 
Achieving Zero Emission and Passive House 
standards in new buildings 
Minimum performance standards for new build-
ings and low-interest loan or subsidy schemes 
for energy-efficient buildings have been the most 
common policy approach towards the new build-
ing sector. Denmark, for example, has tightened 
the energy requirements in its building regu-
lations for new buildings by 25-30% as of 2006 
(app. 25% by 2010). The UK has improved its energy 
efficiency standards so that new buildings built 
in 2007 are 40% more efficient than those built 
in 2002. The UK is also envisaging making all 
homes in England carbon neutral (“carbon zero”) 
by 2016, according to its National Energy Efficiency 
Action Plan. The recasting of the European Buildings 
Directive will also have a major role to play in 
improving standards for all kinds of buildings 
(residential, public, commercial and industrial) to 
passive-house levels as a first step and net-zero 
energy levels as the second. 
In order to support this process through green 
investment programmes, two types of pilot 
projects should be funded at EU level:
1. Financial support for energy-plus houses pro-
vides both an example and experimental area for 
new buildings in general. Energy-plus houses 
produce more energy from renewable sources 
on average over the course of a year than they 
import from external sources. The links between 
high energy performance standards in building 
structures and the use of renewable energies or 
decentralised energy supply systems (e.g. CHP) 
for heat and electricity need to be addressed. 
2. The integration of low emission strategies in 
buildings with resource efficiency requires further 
external financial support. Labelling systems like 
BREEAM, CASBEE, Effinergie, DGNB and LEED 
can help raise awareness of the materials used 
and life-cycles in new buildings. Additionally, 
buildings certified with such labels provide 
incentives and political support to improve energy 
related labelling schemes in EU Member States. 
3. In the new building sector as well, the perspec-
tive should be extended from single buildings to 
entire urban areas and environments (see above). 
In the context of a green investment programme, 
cities and municipalities could be financially sup-
ported in planning and implementing settlements 
with net-zero energy or energy-plus houses. 
Optimising energy consumption in heating, and 
air-conditioning, and lighting systems
Reducing the energy consumption of heating, 
air-conditioning, and lighting systems is another 
factor in significantly reducing buildings-related 
emissions. Old and inefficient heating systems 
should be replaced or modernised with the help 
of direct EU grants. Energy-efficient motor tech-
nology, for example, can reduce electricity con-
sumption by circulation pumps and fans by up 
to 80%. Similar energy savings are possible in 
tertiary and industrial lighting systems, through 
efficient luminary-ballast-lamp systems com-
bined with daylight and/or occupancy controls. In 
order to accelerate the modernisation and opti-
misation of heating, air-conditioning, and lighting 
systems, the following supporting measures are 
recommended: 
•  replacement of old and inefficient heating  
systems, especially electric heating;
•  further promotion of renewables in heating  
systems (solar thermal collectors, biomass 
boilers) and air conditioning sytems (solar 
cooling) in energy-efficient buildings;
•  support for a significant market diffusion of 
energy-efficient circulation pumps and fans 
as well as implementation of quality control 
schemes for existing heating systems (e.g. 
hydraulic adjustment); 
•  support for a significant market diffusion of 
energy-efficient lighting systems;
•  reduction in net losses in district heating  
systems in CEEC countries (example: the  
national energy efficiency action plan  
of Bulgaria). 
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(2) Strategic Field 2: Reducing Energy Use of 
Electrical Appliances
To reduce the energy use of electrical appliances, 
information and labelling schemes such as the 
EU labels for appliances have been the most 
common way to increase awareness and influ-
ence purchases in this sub-sector. In a few rather 
rare cases, financial incentives in the form of 
fiscal measures or demand-side management 
programmes have been provided. A++ labelled 
refrigerators and freezers save around 45% of 
electricity compared to Class A models, which 
are the market standard. The market penetra-
tion of such efficient appliances is, however, still 
very low. Reducing the on-mode consumption of 
office, communication, and entertainment appli-
ances could also be given more financial support 
enabling a faster market transformation. This will 
both accelerate the transition to the phase when 
the EuP standards come into force and promote 
even more energy-efficient appliances.
The following measures are recommended: 
•  supporting programmes for the most energy-
efficient white appliances;
•  supporting programmes for office, communication, 
and entertainment appliances without a stand-by 
function and with low on-mode consumption. 
(3) Strategic Field 3: Reducing emissions in 
industrial processes 
Loan schemes, grants or direct subsidies for 
the promotion of energy efficiency actions and 
renewable energies in industry are offered in 
many Member States. Besides direct financing 
measures such as grants or loan schemes, some 
countries allow tax rebates for investments in 
energy efficiency, as documented for example in 
the Belgian and French National Energy Efficiency 
Action Plans. Another example is the Dutch Energy 
Investment Deduction (EID), which offers extra 
tax breaks in the form of additional deductions on 
taxable profit in return for investments in energy 
efficiency. In the UK, the Enhanced Capital 
Allowances (ECA) scheme gives businesses in the 
tertiary sector a 100% tax allowance in the first 
year on designated energy efficient equipment 
investments. In most cases, the financial support 
for energy efficient appliances is complemented 
by incentives targeting the promotion of renew-
able energies or combined heat and power (CHP). 
The Netherlands has an energy tax in the form 
of a levy on energy consumption and covers all 
sectors (also Germany). Since 1999, Finland has 
supported energy-saving investments by private-
sector companies through subsidies (new tech-
nologies: 25-35%; conventional technologies: 
15-20%, valid only for companies that joined 
the national energy conservation agreements). 
Subsidies will also be part of the new energy-
efficiency agreements concluded for the period 
between 2008 and 2016. 
Following on from this, an EU-based funding 
scheme should support such measures, while 
leaving Member States free to decide how to 
implement them. A combination of free or subsi-
dised energy audits (advisory and audit vouchers), 
regional and/or sectoral networks and sectoral 
energy schemes (as in North Rhine-Westphalia), 
energy services, and targeted financial support 
programmes to promote end-use actions identi-
fied in the sectoral networks or schemes, appears 
to be the most successful package for stimulat-
ing energy efficiency in SMEs. All of this should 
be organised and financed in the Member State 
by national, regional, and local energy agencies, 
with financial support from the EU in the frame-
work of a green investment programme.
(4) Strategic Field 4: Improving Electricity Grids 
and Smart Metering in the EU 
Diffusion of Smart-Metering Systems 
Recent EU regulation, especially the Directive on 
energy end-use efficiency and energy services 
(ESD), has clearly emphasised the role of smart 
metering systems in reducing energy consump-
tion and CO2 emissions. The majority of existing 
electricity and gas meters are either not acces- 
sible for consumers or provide limited information 
only. The direct monitoring of energy consumption 
© iStockphoto.com/Rhienna Cutler
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through smart metering systems can stimulate 
energy saving by consumers and offers the pos-
sibility of additional energy-related load manage-
ment services. So far, however, in most Member 
States only pilot projects have been designed and 
implemented, predominantly in co-operation with 
energy suppliers and energy service companies. 
The design of a European investment programme 
of smart metering systems, would therefore help 
achieve the goals of: 
•  promoting awareness of energy consumption, 
energy costs and greenhouse gases emissions 
among consumers; 
•  stimulating consumers to monitor energy 
consumption and to take additional action to 
save money on their energy bills, provided they 
receive advice on what action they could take 
and its benefits;
•  decreasing the running costs of metering and 
billing;
•  creating the technical ability to cope with peak 
demand and the integration of renewable  
energy sources.
Developing Smart Grids 
Spreading smart-metering systems also requires 
the European electricity grid to be improved and 
made more flexible. The current structure of 
the European grid is also challenged by general 
developments in the energy supply market, such as 
the changing energy mix in Europe, the integration 
of decentralised renewable large supply systems, 
and the integration of large-scale offshore wind 
and concentrated solar power plants. Only inno-
vative and smart grid technologies will be able to 
manage these strategic challenges and realise the 
potential for further energy conservation.
The European Technology Platform Smart Grids 
developed a comprehensive research agenda 
which provides important elements for delivering 
a green investment programme in this sector (CEC 
2007c). Five research opportunities are identified 
in this context: 
•  smart distribution infrastructure (small  
customers and network design);
•  smart operation, energy flows and customer 
adaptation (small customers and networks);
•  smart grid assets and asset management 
(transmission and distribution); 
•  European interoperability of smart grids 
(transmission and distribution);
• smart grids cross-cutting issues and catalysts.
Pilot projects could be funded by a European  
investment programme to improve European 
grids to make them more flexible and stable.
6.3 Resource Policy – Problems and 
Challenges in the European Union
Europe depends on a wide variety of natural 
resources from domestic sources, as well from 
other parts of the world. Rising global demand 
from emerging economies and the scarcity of 
natural resources will limit access to resources 
(e.g. metals) and drive up prices.
The significant potential to reduce costs is there-
fore a strong economic argument and a main 
driver for resource efficiency, with two major 
effects: improved competitiveness and job creation. 
Resource productivity could therefore be a core 
element of a Green New Deal which would not 
only have a short-term impact but also mean a 
stronger economy overall.
Aspects of resource scarcity, resource producti-
vity, competitiveness and jobs creation will now 
be discussed in more detail.
6.3.1 Risks and impacts of resource use
Since the1980s, total global extraction of both 
abiotic (fossil fuels, minerals) and biotic (agricul-
ture, forestry, fishing) resources has increased 
steadily. Between 1980 and 2005, resource 
extraction levels grew from 40 to 58 billion tonnes. 
A total of about 80 billion tonnes is predicted by 
2020 - 200% of 1980 figure (Giljum et al. 2008). 
While the global share of extraction by the BRIICS 
countries (Brazil, Russia, India, Indonesia, China 
and South Africa) and the rest of the world (non-
OECD) is increasing, the global share of the OECD 





















































































Figure 19 Development of global resource extraction by major groups of resources (SERI Global Material Flow 
Database (www.materialflows.net); Giljum et al. 2009) and by regions (OECD 2008)
Although the EU’s own resource extraction is 
decreasing, it remains a major extractor. In gen-
eral, OECD and EU-25 demand is higher than 
extraction rates (Giljum et al. 2008), while resource- 
exporting countries tend to extract more than they 
consume. Thus there is a net transfer of natural 
resources to the OECD countries and the EU-25.
The EU-25 needs to import about 21% of its 
resources for the production of goods for final 
demand, which underlines the EU’s depend-
ency on the extraction of natural resources in 
other parts of the world (Giljum et al. 2008). This 
dependency cannot be alleviated by expand-
ing domestic extraction as deposits of natural 
resources are limited in the EU (Bleischwitz et al. 
2009b).
Europe’s dependency on other countries will thus 
increase in cases where resources are strategi-
cally important and not available on EU territory. 
This dependency will intensify as the relevance 
of the OECD countries for future global resource 
extraction is shrinking (see figure 19).
Increasing global demand for resources in the 
years before the economic crisis led to an enor-
mous increase in raw material prices. Countries 
with relative resource scarcity are facing growing 
competition for resources. If global demand 
increases again after the crisis, access to 
resources on world markets would become more 
difficult and expensive (Bleischwitz et al. 2009b).
In addition to economic risks, overseas resource 
extraction coupled with ecological risks contribute 
to an environmental burden-shifting from Europe 
to other regions of the world.
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In addition, more natural resources are being 
used than the environment is able to regenerate. 
As a result, natural habitats are being destroyed, 
biological diversity is dramatically reduced, air, 
water and soil polluted etc. In short, increased 
efficiency in using non-renewable and renewable 
resources decreases the overall pressure on the 
environment.
6.3.2 Resource productivity and competitiveness
Cost arguments support a positive correlation 
between resource productivity and competitiveness. 
Companies which spend less on resources have 
lower production costs. According to the German 
Federal Statistical Office, the share of materials 
as a proportion of overall costs in German 
manufacturing industries increased from 37.4% to 
42.9% between 1995 and 2006, while labour costs 
decreased from 24.7% to 18.2% (see figure 20).
These figures imply that for reducing costs in 
manufacturing industries, resource costs have 
become more significant than labour costs. We 
may assume that natural resources have also 
become more relevant for improving overall 
competitiveness.
Bleischwitz et al. (2009b) support this assumption 
with a positive correlation between resource pro-
ductivity and competitiveness among countries 
in the EU-25. The study correlated the Growth 
Competitive Index of the World Economic Forum 
(2002) against the resource productivity of EU 
economies (figure 21). A regression analysis 
identifies resource productivity to be a driver of 
competitiveness. A central argument of resource 
productivity as a competitive advantage is the 
high cost-saving potential in material purchasing 
and transformation, waste handling and energy 
consumption. Improved quality through radical 
innovation and reduced environmental impact 
are also linked to competitive advantages through 
resource productivity. Finally, improved resource 
productivity increases planning security, which 
is also a factor contributing to competitiveness 
(Bleischwitz et al. 2009b).
Figure 20 Development of material and labour cost in the German manufacturing industry (Statistische Bundesamt 
2008)
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6.3.3 Employment impact of resource productivity
As described above, material costs average about 
40% of total costs in the German manufacturing 
industry, and we may assume similar cost rela-
tions in other EU economies. But cost rationali-
sation in companies often means reduced labour 
costs and therefore increased unemployment. 
The cost reductions through increased resource 
productivity could reduce the pressure on labour 
and save jobs. 
Meyer et al. (2007) have modelled the economic 
effect of increased resource productivity on the 
German economy. The so-called Aachener Scenario 
is based on the assumption of a 20% reduction of 
material and energy costs in the manufacturing 
sectors, construction and public administration in 
11 years (linearly from 2005 to 2016). The simulation 
resulted in positive net job effect of 1 million 
employees by 2016 in Germany alone (ibid).14
In summary, by implementing strategies for 
improving resource productivity the EU could: 
• strengthen the security of resource supplies;
• prepare for and avoid increased resource prices;
•  take advantage of the competitive advantage of 
cost reduction;
• realise considerable job-creation potential;
•  reduce the overall pressure on the  
environment significantly.
6.3.4 Strategies of Resource Efficiency Policy
The European Sustainable Development Strategy 
intends to “break the link between economic 
growth, the use of resources and the generation 
of waste” (European Commission 2001, p.12). 
The 6th Environmental Action Programme aims 
at “better resource efficiency and resource and 
waste management to bring about more sus-
tainable production and consumption patterns, 
thereby decoupling the use of resources and the 
generation of waste from the rate of economic 
growth and aiming to ensure that the consump-
tion of renewable and non-renewable resources 
does not exceed the carrying capacity of the envi-
ronment” (European Parliament & Council of the 
European Union 2002, p.3). 
The European Commission uses Domestic Material 
Consumption (DMC) as an indicator to measure 
overall resource consumption. The DMC “meas-
ures the total amount of material directly used in 
the economy. It is defined as all materials directly 
entering the national economy (used domestic 
extraction plus imports), minus the materials 
that are exported” (European Commission & 
Eurostat 2005, p.119). The relation of the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) to DMC describes 
resource productivity (figure 9).
The monitoring of the EU SDS (Eurostat 2005) 
shows that the EU-15 have already broken the 
link between GDP growth and resource use 
14   The term car-sharing is used in the sense of an organised short-term car-rental, in contrast to private car sharing.
Figure 21 Resource productivity versus competitiveness (Bleischwitz et al.2009b, p.36)
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Figure 22 EU-15 DMC versus GDP at constant prices, index 1995=100 (Eurostat 2007)
Resource productivity
Definition: Resource productivity is GDP divided by domestic material consumption.
Domestic material consumption (DMC) measures the total amount of materials directly used 
by an economy. It is defined as the annual quantity of raw materials extracted from the domes-
tic territory of the focal economy, plus all physical imports minus all physical exports. It is im-
portant to note that the term ‘consumption’ as used in DMC denotes ‘apparent consumption’ 
and not ‘final consumption’. DMC does not include upstream hidden flows related to imports 
and exports of raw materials and products.
Headline indicator
One of the main objectives in the renewed sustainable development strategy, under the key 
challenge of sustainable consumption and production, is to decouple economic growth from 
environmental degradation. Under the key challenge ‘conservation and management of nat-
ural resources’, another objective is ‘improving resource efficiency, to reduce the overall use of 
non-renewable natural resources and the related environmental impacts of raw materials use, 
thereby using renewable resources at a rate that does not exceed their regeneration capacity’.
Resource productivity is an aggregate measure of the material efficiency of an economy and 
provides insights into whether decoupling between the use of natural resource and economic 
growth is taking place. Taken on its own, DMC also provides an assessment of the absolute 
level of use of scarce resources. In environmental terms DMC can be seen as an indicator that 
reflects all materials that are emitted from or accumulated in a given region. As accumulated 
materials (i.e. physical stocks) will turn into emissions and wastes at some point in time in the 
future, the indicative value of DMC is the waste potential of a given region.
DMC is used as a proxy for the more relevant indicator, total material consumption (TMC), 
which includes upstream hidden flows related to imports and exports of raw materials, finished 
and semi-manufactured products. EU level TMC is still under development as few Member 
States are able to calculate it at this stage. In addition, DMC and TMC are only a rough proxy 
for measuring the overall environmental impact of resource use, as materials have very differ-
ent impacts on the environment. An indicator on the environmental impact of material use 
needs to be developed.
Indicator 
relevance
Figure 4.1: EU-15 resource productivity over time 
(index 2000=100)
Source: urostat.
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(figure 22). Although resource productivity is 
steadily increasing (relative decoupling), Europe’s 
absolute resource use remains at a high level, 
with economic and environmental consequences 
see (6.3.1). Policy measure should therefore 
focus on an absolute decoupling of resource use 
and economic growth.
DMC as an indicator for resource use does not 
include hidden flows (“ecological rucksacks”) 
that arise from the extraction or processing of 
resources. In particular, imported goods are 
linked to large hidden flows. Europe is currently 
improving its resource productivity by increas-
ing resource imports. The environmental burden 
connected to resource extraction is increasingly 
shifted to other countries (see 6.3.1). Therefore, 
an indicator should be chosen which includes all 
hidden flows of resource consumption. Schepel-
mann et al. (2006) have proposed to the Europe-
an Parliament using the indicator Total Material 
Requirement (TMR) to measure the progress of 
resource efficiency policy.
This leads to consideration of targets. Neither 
the 6th Environmental Action programme, nor 
Thematic Strategy on the Sustainable Use of 
Natural Resources, proposes adequate targets, 
and the EU lacks concrete measures for achieving 
improved resource efficiency (Schepelmann et al. 
2006).
In contrast to the EU, Germany has adopted the 
target of doubling raw material productivity by 
2020 (excluding biomass and the ecological ruck-
sacks; see Hennicke & Sewerin 2009) compared 
with 1994 (Federal Government Germany 2002). 
In this context, a consortium of more than 30 
institutes coordinated by the Wuppertal Institute 
has analysed five objectives in the framework 
of the “MaRess” study. These five objectives are 
briefly introduced in the following chapter.
6.3.5 Core objectives for improved resource 
efficiency
Resource efficiency has to be part of a more 
comprehensive vision of sustainable industrial 
societies. Bringezu & Bleischwitz (2009) have 
outlined what a potentially sustainable resource 
basis for the EU should look like. They characterise 
a future sustainable society by four paradigmatic 
and complementary perspectives: 
1. A resource-efficient and recycling-based  
industrial sector. 
2. A steady stocks society, in which the material 
growth of the economy will be superseded by a 
dynamic equilibrium between construction and 
deconstruction.
3. A solar economy using the natural energy 
supply from the sun; and 
4. A balanced bio-economy based on the  
sustainable use of biological resources.
The dynamics and features of visionary elements 
which Bringezu & Bleischwitz (2009) have 
described may provide orientation for technology 
and policy development.
On a pragmatic and short- to mid-term basis, 
Kristof & Hennicke (2009) propose five core 
objectives for the first paradigm of a resource-
efficient and recycling-based industry: 
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1. Sustainable markets of the future – providing 
a direction for innovation.
2. Strong institutions – key to successful diffusion.
3. Resource-efficient products and services.
4. The Government as consumer – role model 
and market power.
5. Changes in people’s thinking.
Sustainable markets of the future – providing a 
direction for innovation
Markets should promote innovations with a 
focus on improved resource efficiency. Political 
organisation of the market framework conditions 
should create incentives for the development of 
resource-efficient innovations and reduce coun-
ter-productive incentives. As a result, research 
and development would be oriented towards 
resource-efficient solutions and the development 
of resource-efficient products and services.
Resulting upcoming innovations need to be intro-
duced and established on the market. The diffusion 
of these innovations on the EU market and exports 
to international markets needs to be supported by 
instruments such as support for trade fairs, market 
information and technology platforms. Existing 
RTD programmes and technology platforms need 
adjusting to support resource-efficient solutions 
and their diffusion on the market.
Strong institutions – key to successful diffusion
Improving the resource efficiency of a company is 
often difficult. Companies often lack the exper-
tise and the resources necessary to implement 
resource-efficiency measures. SMEs in particu-
lar often lack both the expertise and the time to 
launch such measures. 
To realise efficiency potential, individual and spe-
cialised consultancy services are required. These 
can adapt to the actual situation of a company and 
follow the whole restructuring process required.
This kind of service requires a large pool of con-
sultants. Experience in Germany has shown that 
an intermediate agent can successfully support 
cooperation between companies and adequate 
consultants. The networking German Material 
Efficiency Agency (Demea) informs public and 
private institutions about the necessity and bene-
fits of improved resource efficiency, educates and 
collects consultants, provides access to consult-
ants, and manages networks to provide know-
ledge exchange and cooperation between different 
companies, consultants, sectors and regions. 
 
Resource efficient products and services
There are three possible types of political action 
to support resource-efficient products and ser-
vices on the market:
•  first, in accordance with the first core objective, 
cutting-edge products need to be supported, 
especially in the phases of design and market 
introduction;
•  second, standards need to direct average mass 
market products towards improved resource 
efficiency. Existing standards like the eco- 
design directive (2005/32/EG) should be upgraded 
to include resource-efficiency requirements;
•  third, new resource-efficiency standards 
should also include minimum requirements 
for products on the market. As a result, 
products with old, resource-consuming 
designs will be banned from the market. 
The Government as consumer – role model and 
market power
Strategic consumption can force markets towards 
more resource-efficient products and services. 
Governments usually have strong market power 
since public procurement accounts for a large 
share of total market consumption. Resource 
efficiency can be established as an important 
factor through specific public purchasing direc-
tives. This would also be an incentive to design 
resource-efficient products, since the commer-
cial risk is limited by stable demand from public 
institutions.
Moreover, governments can play a pioneering 
role. If resource efficiency is established and con-
sistently applied, long-term cost advantages can 
be realised. The state can also set an example of 
socially responsible behaviour.
Changes in people’s thinking
The four objectives listed above can only be 
realised when people (institutions, companies etc.) 
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understand the importance of and opportunities 
for improved resource efficiency. In order to 
raise awareness of resource efficiency, all pos-
sible communication and education channels 
have to be used. Young people need to learn in 
school about resource-efficient behaviour. Later 
in their education and studies, they should be 
taught about resource-efficient technologies and 
services not only to create awareness, but also 
professional qualifications. In addition, the topic 
of resource efficiency has to be communicated 
through specific marketing campaigns. Visuali-
sation of the need for – and benefits of – resource 
efficiency using best practice examples is essen-
tial to support the cognitive process in people’s 
minds. The necessary communication and edu-
cation process must become part of normal life.
Although improved resource efficiency has 
remarkable cost advantages and is very impor-
tant for the security of resource supply, it has to 
overcome the inertia of a society and a market 
adapted to high levels of resource consumption. 
Therefore, political action on a wide scale is needed. 
For all objectives described above, an analysis 
of potential and most relevant sectors should be 
carried out in order to develop an efficient, har-
monised and target-oriented policy mix.
6.3.6 Resource Efficiency and Green New Deal
Many of the objectives described in section 6.3.5 
require legislative measures and are therefore not 
compatible with a short-term oriented Green New 
Deal, but should be treated as mid- to long-term 
objectives. Ideally, Green New Deal policies should 
initiate a process of change and help to overcome 
short-term barriers and disadvantages hampering 
the achievement of mid- to long-term objectives.
In a first step towards improved resource efficiency, 
the existing EU-wide expertise should be gath-
ered, assessed and improved where necessary. 
This could be achieved by establishing a European 
Resource Efficiency Agency (EREA). Its primary 
objective would be the development and coordina-
tion of Resource Efficiency Agencies and similar 
agencies in the Member States. The aim would be 
an EU-wide network of research and technological 
development for improved resource efficiency. The 
EREA would initiate international cooperation and 
communication to raise awareness in Member 
States and industrial sectors in order to stimulate 
demand for consultancy services. Awareness of 
cost-reduction potential among decision-makers 
in industry would lead to increased demand for 
specific resource-efficiency technologies, prod-
ucts and services. The desired long-term effect 
would be self-sustaining competition to achieve 
the cost advantages of resource efficiency in the 
© Shutterstock
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EU’s manufacturing industry. This would result in 
increased demand for scientific and engineering 
skills which cannot be met by the existing market. 
Therefore, these measures would have to be 
accompanied by the creation of the necessary 
infrastructures for research, training and education. 
Nevertheless, in the short term, less refined 
approaches would be sufficient to harvest the 
“low hanging fruits” by reducing the most obvious 
resource inefficiencies (see figure 9).
To harvest these “low hanging fruits”, the EU 
regions can build on more than 10 years of experi-
ence in existing resource-efficiency agencies. For 
example, the regional resource-efficiency agency 
of North Rhine-Westphalia (Effizienz-Agentur 
NRW – EFA) is providing effective consultancy 
services. It has established a number of tools to 
improve production, products, cost accounting 
and the financing of measures. At national level, 
the German resource-efficiency agency (DEMEA) 
provides two basic programmes. The NeMat pro-
gramme supports networking between com-
panies in order to strengthen their competitive 
position based on cooperative improvement of 
material efficiency. The VerMat programme sup-
ports the individual consultancy of companies 
through a pool of consultants. 
Alongside the EREA, national Resource Efficiency 
Funds (REF) could be established. These funds 
would finance resource efficiency, especially in 
SMEs, which often lack sufficient capital and 
expertise for resource-efficiency measures. The 
national REFs could co-finance EU Regional Policy. 
Resource-efficient public procurement could be 
an additional instrument to support resource effi-
ciency directly. Public institutions should improve 
procurement procedures and assets by investing 
in resource-efficient products and services. 
The combination of an EREA, the availability of 
funds (national REF + EU Cohesion Funds) and 
improved public procurement could have a short-
term impact on economic development and job 
creation. Combined with a harmonised, target-
oriented policy mix, this could eventually lead 
to self-sustaining demand for resource-efficient 
products and services, with a lasting impact on 
consumption and production patterns (ecological 
modernisation). 
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Europe in 2009 is confronted with multiple crises 
– financial, economic, environmental and social. 
The need for sustainable policies is self-evident. 
The European Greens are proposing a “Green 
New Deal”, an integrated policy to approach 
these challenges. The concept tackles the crisis 
not exclusively as an economic one and calls for 
the ecological transformation of our economies 
towards more sustainable and equitable patterns 
of consumption and production.
The Wuppertal Institute report focuses on the 
climate, environment and energy aspects of this 
Green New Deal. It takes stock of the “recovery 
packages” introduced by governments around 
the globe and reveals that the European Union 
is lagging behind the United States and Asia 
in terms of the Green share of those recovery 
plans. The authors show the economic and 
employment potential of a Green New Deal 
and that the EU has the possibility of leading 
the way. If it is not to miss this opportunity, the 
European Union and its Member States must 
focus their programmes on investments that 
will kick-start a Green economy and provide 
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